Her Enemies Failed to Stop Memorial for Barbara Kulazska: Free Speech 1; Censors 0!

Her Enemies Failed to Stop Memorial for Barbara Kulazska: Free Speech 1; Censors 0!

On June 15, we lost lawyer Barbara Kulazska to lung cancer at age 64. [An obituary will appear in THE FREE SPEECH MONITOR next month.] Barbara was one of the most important free speech lawyers of her generation. She worked closely with Douglas Christie in Zundel 11, in the Zundelsite case and did fantastic work with Marc Lemire in fighting Richard Warman and getting Sec. 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act (Internet censorship) declared unconstitutional.

 

However, the dark forces of thought control and censorship could not leave this formidable woman alone in death. The Canadian Association for Free Expression organized a private memorial on July 12 at the Richview Branch of the Toronto Public Library. Word leaked out on July 10. The enemies of free speech — Warren Kinsella, a major antagonist in the YOUR WARD NEWS mailing rights appeal,  Richard Warman (many of whose libel case victims she had defended), the usual Jewish pro-censorship groups, Bernie Farber , assorted street thugs and even John Tory, Mayor of Toronto, demanded that the memorial be cancelled. The library hung tough and laid on extra security. A senior manager sat in to make sure there was no “hate speech” (What a pathetic nation we’ve become!) Metro Police sent three masked Antifa street urchins, one allegedly a masked female, packing. The emotional farewell proceeded quietly and respectfully.

 Image result for barbara kulazska memorial

The voices raised to cancel the meeting were marked by their  vehemence and rage. “Warren Kinsella, a Toronto-based political consultant and commentator who is a staunch opponent of Fromm’s, disagreed.  ‘Public services are not supposed to be used to promote discrimination. The library in Etobicoke is doing that.'” (CBC News, July 12, 2017) How is honouring a dead lady “discrimination”? You’d suspect such lack of logic more from the Antifa street losers who’d sucked too long on their crack pipes. “‘It is truly shocking that individuals who spread hatred, deny the Holocaust and have ties to neo-Nazi groups are being provided a permit by the Toronto Public Library to host an event inside a public building,’ [Councillor James] Pasternak said. “Those tied to hate and bigotry have no place in our libraries.” Pasternak, who likely did not hail from County Tipperary, clearly supports political discrimination.

 

And then, of course, Bernie Farber, for years an executive with the Canadian Jewish Congress and now a CEO with  multiculti Mosaic, who also seeks to have YOUR WARD NEWS shut down added his two shekels worth: ” “In my view, Barbara Kulaszka was, like her late predecessor and colleague Doug Christie, a fellow traveller of those neo-Nazis, Holocaust deniers and hatemongers for whom she acted as legal counsel,” Bernie Farber added. When the censorship efforts failed,  long time leftist Farber was still given a column in the “right-wing“ Toronto Sun (July 16) to moan and groan. He claimed he`d no longer feel safe in a library. “Be prepared folks for this is only the beginning. neo-Nazis, racists, bigots and bullies will now use Toronto Libraries as their official meeting place. Libraries will no longer be that haven of calm, peace and safety I so well remember as a child.`

Beside itself that it hadn`t been able to shut down the memorial, elements of the lamestream media took their revenge. 

The sleazy National Post (July 13, 2017) devoted almost a full page to the memorial. Its headline screamed `Far-right extremists converge at memorial. `The reporter wasn`t there and chose to use the weaponized words to signal that the attendees were  `bad`. As if to illustrate this was a large picture of three goons in black masks. The caption read: `Three masked people stood outside the Richview branch of the Toronto Public Library while a memorial for Toronto lawyer Barbara Kulazska was held. `One might reasonably conclude that these thugs were guards or attendees. In fact, they were Antifa who had shown up to protest and were told by the police to get lost. And, not to be picky, Miss Kulazska was not a `Toronto` lawyer. However, the controlled media never let the facts get in the way of a good smear.

And the supposedly “right wing” Toronto Sun (July 13, 2017) ran a rant by Liz Braun “Don’t blame library for hate gathering.” The headline was a lie. The memorial was NOT a “hate” gathering. Hate, sadly is a criminal offence in this country. No one at that meeting was charged let alone convicted for anything said that night. The meeting was to celebrate the life of a brave diligent woman. It wasn’t about hating anybody. Braun had not attended the memorial but described the attendees as ” pathetic anti-Semitic/anti-black/anti-female/homophobic/Islamophobic/etc. garden variety bigots” Nothing at the meeting was said criticizing  Blacks, women,  homosexuals or Moslems. Indeed we were honouring a woman!

MEMORIAL FOR BARBARA KULAZSKA — TORONTO, WEDNESDAY, JULY 12, 2017

MEMORIAL FOR BARBARA KULAZSKA — TORONTO, WEDNESDAY, JULY 12, 2017

July 8, 2017

barb.jpg

(Barbara left, with Doug Christie & Marc Lemire)
 
Barbara Kulazska RIP  
 
Canadian free speech lawyer and close associate of Doug Christie, Barbara Kulaszka, passed away at age 64 from lung cancer on June 15. 
 
Barbara played a key role in research and drafting legal facta in the second Zundel “false news” trial in 1988. She was a huge help in Doug Christie’s attack on Canada’s war crimes law in the Finta case in 1990. The appeal to the Supreme Court virtually destroyed the law’s usefulness to the vengeance lobby as the following of reasonable orders was accepted as a defence.
 
In later years, Barbara was a vigorous defender of free speechers charged with libel by Richard Warman, people like Marc and Connie Fournier (a long and complicated case) and myself.
 
She was Marc Lemire’s lawyer in his heroic confrontation with the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal. He was prosecuted — another Richard Warman complaint — under the notorious Sec . 13 (Internet censorship) which was repealed by Parliament in 2012. Marc’s was the first victory — even if partial — under Sec. 13. She continued to represent him as the  question of the constitutionality of Sec. 13 moved to the Federal Court and then the Federal Court of Appeal in 2013. She also represented Henry Makow in a complaint from the Canadian Jewish Congress to the CHRC. 
 
Barbara had been in delicate health for many years.
 
She was first trained as a librarian and then switched to law.
 
She died in her hometown of Brighton, Ontario, surrounded by family.
 
Memorial Event
 
* Music by Christian Klein and Dieter Kahl.
* Tributes by Marc Lemire,  Christian Klein, Lynda Mortl, Paul Fromm and others.
* Tributes read from people across the world.
TORONTO. Wednesday,  July 12, 2017. Richview Library, Auditorium (1806 Islington Ave, Etobicoke, ON.  — two blocks north of Eglinton (6:15 p.m). **** NEW LOCATION & TIME****Admission $10.00

Political Censorship in Canada: The Thought Control Freaks at the Canadian Human Rights Commission Tried to Prosecute Webmaster Marc Lemire for This Satirical Poem

Political Censorship in Canada: The Thought Control Freaks at the Canadian Human Rights Commission Tried to Prosecute Webmaster Marc Lemire for This Satirical Poem

Satire is the use of humour and exaggeration for social criticism. Few creatures on God’s green earth are more joyless and humourless than the politically correct. Even a jackass occasionally cracks a smile. And there are few people more humourless than the Canadian Human Rights Commission thought police. In a Richard Warman complaint (yes, who else, but the complaint champion?), Marc Lemire was accused of exposing privileged minorities to “hatred or contempt” for publishing what has been referred to as “the Immigrant Poem” on his website, The Freedomsite.

 

This poem in one form or another has circulated around the office water cooler for 30 years. While Marc Lemire was not convicted, that such harmless political satire could ever land a person in trouble shows how bitter is the struggle for the freedom of speech of Canada’s dispossessed European Majority.

 

Luckily, in June of this year, Sec. 13, the censorship provision of the Canadian Human Rights Act, was finally repealed by Parliament.

 

CAFE played a major role in the battle to rid Canada of at least this weapon of thought control.

 

Paul Fromm

Director

CANADIAN ASSOCIATION FOR FREE EXPRESSION

 

CAFE NEEDS YOUR HELP AGAIN FOR THE FREE SPEECH BATTLES OF 2014

CAFE, Box 332, Rexdale, Ontario, M9W 5L3

 

___    Here is my donation of $_______ to help CAFÉ’s ambitious campaign for free speech across Canada   in 2014, supporting Arthur Topham and other victims of censorship.

___Please renew my subscription for 2014 to the Free Speech Monitor ($15).

$___  Ken Hilborn booklet order from back of this coupon.

 

Please charge ______myVISA/Mastercard#________________________________________________________________

 

Expiry date: __________ Signature:_______________________________________________________________________________

 

Name:____________________________________________________________________________________

 

Address: __________________________________________________________________________________

 

_______________________________________________________Email______________________________

 

  Ken Hilborn Booklets

Professor Kenneth H.W. Hilborn was an outspoken scourge of political correctness. Over a 28 year period, he wrote 13 booklets for C-FAR’s Canadian Issue Series. Here is a selection you might wish to add to your library.

 

__ The Cult of the Victim $5.00

__ The Quest for “Equality” , $5.00

__  Sins of the “Liberal” Left: A Study of Myths, Misdeeds and Misconceptions  (1998) , $5.00

__  Liberty Under Attack: Crimes, Follies and Lunacies that Threaten  Our Freedoms, $5.00

__  Fighting Bad Ideas: Thoughts of Fools, Fanatics, Conspirators & Spies, $5.00,

__  Nightmares and a Dream: A Story of Future Threats to Western Liberty and How Liberty Might Win,  $7.00

__  In the Cause of the West: Thoughts on the Past, Present and Future of A Threatened Civilization, $7.00

__  The Trouble With Truth, $7.00

 

[Tick booklets you want here and indicate the number and enter dollar amount on the other side of this coupon.]

 

 

 

 
I cross ocean, poor and broke.
Take bus, see employment folk.

Nice man treat me good in there.
Say I need to see welfare.

Welfare say, ‘You come no more, we send cash right to your door.’

Welfare cheques – they make you wealthy! Alberta Health Care – it keep you healthy!

By and by, I get plenty money.
Thanks to you, you Canadian dummy!

Write to friends in motherland.
Tell them ‘come fast as you can.’
  
They come in turbans and Ford trucks,
And buy big house with welfare bucks!

They come here, we live together.
More welfare cheques, it gets better!
       
Fourteen families, they moving in,
but neighbour’s patience wearing thin.
Finally, Canadian guy moves away.
Now I buy his house, then I say,
 
‘Find more immigrants for house to rent.’
And in the yard I put a tent.

 

 

 

Everything is very good,
and soon we own the neighbourhood.
      

We have hobby, it’s called breeding. Welfare pay for baby feeding.
Kids need dentist? Wives need pills? We get free! We got no bills!
Canadians crazy! They work all year, to keep the welfare running here.
We think Canada darn good place.
Too darn good for that white race!
If they no like us, they can scram. Got lots of room in Afghanistan!

CAFE Submissions in Federal Court of Appeal: Marc Lemire v Canadian Human Rights Commission & Richard Warman

CAFE Submissions in Federal Court of Appeal: Marc Lemire v Canadian Human Rights Commission & Richard Warman

Court File No.: A-456-12

 

FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

 

BETWEEN:

MARC LEMIRE

Appellant

 

– and –

 

CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

RICHARD WARMAN

Respondents

 

– and –

 

AFRICAN CANADIAN LEGAL CLINIC

CANADIAN CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION

CANADIAN ASSOCIATION FOR FREE EXPRESSION

Interveners

 

______________________________________________________________________________

 

MEMORANDUM OF FACT AND LAW OF THE INTERVENER,

THE CANADIAN ASSOCIATION FOR FREE EXPRESSION

______________________________________________________________________________

 

 

 

 

Solicitor for the Intervener,

The Canadian Association for Free Expression:

 

Barclay W. Johnson

1027 Pandora Avenue

Victoria, BC V8V 3P6

 

Phone: 250-418-3255

Fax: 250-370-1655

 

PART I: STATEMENT OF FACTS:

 

  1. In Mr. Lemire’s case, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal found a single infraction of Section 13(1), in regard to an article on Mr. Lemire’s website that he did not write. The website in question was located on a server in the United States. Similar material is legally available to Canadians from many other servers, located in the United States and other locations. There is no evidence that anybody aside from the complainant downloaded and read the particular article in question.
  2. In these circumstances, no evidence exists which could possibly tie the obscure article in question to any of the negative effects of hate propaganda described by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Human rights commission) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 SCR 892 and Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, 2013 SCC 11.
  3. In considering the case of Whatcott, the Supreme Court of Canada did not have the benefit of expert testimony to review the Kaufman Report, which was a substantial portion of the Cohen Report relied upon by Parliament when passing Section 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act. The testimony of Dr. Michael Persinger, a professor of psychology and biology who testified before the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal on February 22, 2007, demonstrates that the Kaufman Report used an outdated psychological methodology in dealing with the issue of “hate”:

“MR. CHRISTIE: Now, in neuropsychological, do you use the term hate?

 

DR. PERSINGER: We don’t use the term hate. We use the term aversive stimuli. Hate is a subjective experience and is just simply one of the many labels that people apply to aversive experiences. So we study aversive experiences very, very significantly and frequently including looking at the correlates of brain function. But the term hate is simply one of the many labels that can be applied to an aversive experience.

 

MR. CHRISTIE: Why wouldn’t you use the term hate in any of your research?

 

DR. PERSINGER: Primarily because it’s arbitrary. Secondly, because it’s highly subjective, and third very difficult to quantify because it’s a term that’s used so indiscriminately that you really can’t use it effectively. The term aversive stimulus also is not as pejorative. In other words, it doesn’t have connotations.” [See Examination of Dr. Michael Persinger, pg. 2884(3 – 22)]

 

  1. Dr. Persinger goes on to explain why the context of the internet is far less likely to generate adverse stimulus than that of a telephone answering machine (as in Taylor) or unsolicited pamphlets delivered door-to-door (as in Whatcott). On the internet, messages are only delivered to willing recipients who specifically request them. In addition, internet message boards (such as Lemire’s website) are interactive and allow readers to respond:

    “MR. CHRISTIE: If I were to give you a hypothetical where there are messages in one location which you must go and find, but you also have the option of placing messages equally accessible to the whole world about your own point of view, could you explain how that would affect the ability of an individual to adapt to aversive stimuli?

     

    DR. PERSINGER: I think I understand the context. If, for example, there is an aversive message posted?

     

    MR. CHRISTIE: That’s correct. If I could use a specific example, hoping not to offend anyone if I were to say, I saw a message somewhere that said, all scots are mean, bitter, vicious, dower, penny-pinching, overly aggressive individuals. But I had the option of putting up a message that said that that’s only me and a few other scots and there are some good ones, would that affect the capacity to adapt to what was an aversive stimuli?

     

    DR. PERSINGER: Certainly. There are two options here. One, if it’s a free operant society in the sense that you have choice to read it or not, okay –

     

    MR. CHRISTIE: That’s one premise?

     

    DR. PERSINGER: That’s the important feature. I mean, if you read it and become offended, you also have an opportunity in a free operant setting not to read it and to avoid it. That’s also your choice, if you had that opportunity. On the other hand, you also have a chance to respond to overcome what I guess would be the most appropriate explanation, the categorical error. And a categorical error is over-inclusiveness, to say all scots are this way, all scots are that way. That’s the limit of human language.” [See Examination of Dr. Michael Persinger, pg. 2891(16) – 2892(25)]

     

    PART II: STATEMENT OF ISSUES

     

  2. The internet is a new and unique medium, not contemplated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Taylor, and not considered in Whatcott. Section 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act, insofar as it applies to the internet, does not meet the rational connection portion of the Oakes Test, and is therefore not a reasonable limit on Section 2(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

    PART III: SUBMISSIONS

  3. It will be respectfully submitted that Section 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act, insofar as it relates to the totally new medium of the internet, does not pass the Oakes Test and is therefore an unconstitutional infringement on the right to freedom of expression. In Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 SCR 892, when Section 13(1) was upheld by the narrowest of margins by the Supreme Court of Canada, the Respondent was accused of disseminating hateful views using the telephone, a medium which the court found was “particularly suited” to the distribution of hate propaganda, and linked to its negative effects:

    Simply to label telephone communications as “private”, however, does not justify the conclusion that s. 13(1) is overbroad.  As was noted by the CCLA, the telephone is a medium which allows numerous organizations to present information and views to a sizable proportion of the public, whether through active calling or the use of recorded messages.  While conversations almost always take place on a one-to-one basis, the overall effect of phone campaigns is undeniably public, and the reasonable assumption to make is that these campaigns can have an effect upon the public’s beliefs and attitudes.  Indeed, in the recent case of Nealy, supra, expert evidence presented to the Human Rights Tribunal by Dr. René-Jean Ravault, who also appeared before the Tribunal in Taylor, suggests that the telephone is ideally suited to the effective transmission of prejudicial beliefs, and in this respect the Tribunal stated (at pp. D/6485-86):

     

    This brings us to the second and more specific contextual reason which justifies the compass of the provision and that is the medium through which the hate messages are communicated.  We have earlier pointed to the important testimony of Dr. Ravault as to the attractions and advantages of telephone communication to racists and white supremacists in terms of connecting with and attempting to influence those in the community who are for one reason or another bewildered or disaffected by events and forces over which they feel they have no control.  Dr. Ravault was also able to demonstrate how the authors of hate messages are able through subtle manipulation and juxtaposition of material to give a veneer of credibility to the content of the messages.  The combination of the telephonic medium and the material is, we believe, particularly insidious, because, while a public means of communication is used, it is one which gives the listener the impression of direct, personal, almost private, contact by the speaker, provides no realistic means of questioning the information or views presented and is subject to no counter-argument within that particular communications context.

     

    I agree with the Tribunal’s comments regarding telephone communications and hate propaganda, and find its observations to be helpful in rebutting the contention that the private nature of telephone conversations makes especially difficult the imposition of constitutionally valid limitations upon expressive telephonic activity.  Those who repeatedly communicate messages likely to expose others to racial or religious hatred or contempt are seeking to gain converts to their position.  The evidence of the Cohen Committee, referred to extensively in Keegstra, and expert testimony given before the Tribunals in both Taylor and Nealy, suggest that hate propaganda often works insidiously to spread a message of intolerance and inequality, and that the telephone is particularly suited to this mode of communication.” [Emphasis added]

     

  1. The case at bar is clearly distinguishable in principle as a totally different method of communication. To search out and access a website requires a conscious choice of an internet user to read the content within. Furthermore, the internet is interactive in nature, allowing for response, dialogue, and debate. Finally, the type of content being prohibited is legally available from any number of private internet sources outside of Canada. Without a corresponding prohibition on downloading and reading hate propaganda, the prohibition against Canadians uploading hate propaganda does nothing to make hate propaganda less accessible to Canadians.
  1. In Taylor, all members of the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged that Section 13(1) infringed upon the right to freedom of expression, as protected by Section 2(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The majority (by a 4-to-3 margin), however, found that this infringement was justified as a reasonable limit under Section 1 of the Charter, in accordance with the Oakes test, described by the court as follows:

The tests for determining whether an infringement on a constitutionally guaranteed right or freedom is reasonable and justified in a free and democratic society were established in R. v. Oakes, supra, and have been adhered to ever since.   Two requirements must be satisfied.   First, the objective which the limit is designed to serve must be of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right.   Second, if such an objective is established, the party invoking s. 1 must show that the means chosen to attain the objective are reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.   To conclude that the means chosen are reasonable and demonstrably justified, the Court must be satisfied of three things:

 

1.  The measures designed to meet the legislative objective (in this case s. 13(1) of theCanadian Human Rights Act) must be rationally connected to the objective;

 

2.  The means used should impair as little as possible the right or freedom in question; and

 

3.  There must be proportionality between the effect of the measures which limit theCharter right or freedom and the legislative objective of the limit on those rights.   This involves balancing the invasion of rights guaranteed by theCharter against the objective to which the limitation of those rights is directed.

 

  1. The majority decision, penned by Chief Justice Dickson, found that Section 13(1) could be justified under the Oakes Test because it had the valid objective of preventing harm:

“It can thus be concluded that messages of hate propaganda undermine the dignity and self-worth of target group members and, more generally, contribute to disharmonious relations among various racial, cultural and religious groups, as a result eroding the tolerance and open-mindedness that must flourish in a multicultural society which is committed to the idea of equality.”

 

Section 13(1) can only pass the Oakes Test insofar as it is rationally connected to preventing the aforementioned individual and social harms of hate propaganda.

  1. In 2001, Parliament passed subsection 13(2) of the Canadian Human Rights Act to extend subsection 13(1) to apply to the internet:

“(2) For greater certainty, subsection (1) applies in respect of a matter that is communicated by means of a computer or a group of interconnected or related computers, including the Internet, or any similar means of communication, but does not apply in respect of a matter that is communicated in whole or in part by means of the facilities of a broadcasting undertaking.”

 

Therefore, Lemire is a case of first instance, the first constitutional challenge of Section 13 in the context of the internet. In this context, it will be respectfully submitted that Section 13(1) has no rational connection to the protection of dignity and self-worth of target group members, nor to the prevention of social harms associated with hate propaganda.

Dignity and Self-Worth of Target Group Members:

  1. In regard to the harm caused to members of the target group, the same reasoning cannot and does not apply to the internet as would apply to a publicly-advertised telephone hotline. In the context of the internet, material is transmitted at the request of the recipient. Internet users are free to choose from a wide variety of sources, originating around the world and certainly not limited to Canada. In Lemire’s case, the material was never in fact located “in Canada.” A Canadian such as Richard Warman had to seek the material in the United States to be offended. If and when applied to the internet, Section 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act empowers the Tribunal to award “compensation” to the complainant for communication solicited by and deliberately downloaded by the complainant himself. The content is not even “in Canada” until requested. The act of making data available to those who seek it out is tantamount to a private conversation, not to the public dissemination of hate propaganda to those sincerely wishing to avoid it. The communication only occurs when requested by the recipient and is not normally available to anyone else. It is certainly distinct from the active communication of ideas through public speech to people who might or might not want to hear them. It is also distinguishable from a communication broadcast to all who have not requested it.
  2. In the recent case of Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, 2013 SCC 11, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the hate speech provision in Saskatchewan’s Human Rights Act on the grounds that it prohibits only public and not private communications:

“[83]   … The prohibition only limits the display or publication of representations, such as through newspapers or other printed matter, or through television or radio broadcasting. In other words, it only prohibits public communications of hate speech.  The Saskatchewan legislature does not restrict hateful expression in private communications between individuals. While one would expect private expressions of hateful messages might inflict significant emotional harm, they do not impact the societal status of the protected group.”

 

  1. The application of Section 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act to private conversations would not be a reasonable limit on freedom of expression under the Oakes Test for the simple reason that policing private conversations between consenting adults is not rationally connected to the objective of shielding target groups from hate propaganda. Even more so, it is not proportional to the objective. Like most private conversations, the groups know nothing about it to be insulted, defamed, or injured. Those individuals who were not party to the conversation would not be aware of any effects of hate propaganda in the first place; therefore, banning the conversation would not protect them from any harmful effects. The application of Section 13(1) to the internet is likewise not rationally connected to the protection of target groups because the internet, by its very nature, involves choice on the part of the recipient. Just as criticized groups can choose not to engage in private conversation with individuals who disseminate hate propaganda, they can choose not to visit websites which disseminate hate propaganda.
  2. In the defamation case of Crookes v. Newton, 2011 SCC 47, the Supreme Court of Canada made clear that merely making something available does not amount to “communication”:

    “Hyperlinks thus share the same relationship with the content to which they refer as do references. Both communicate that something exists, but do not, by themselves, communicate its content. And they both require some act on the part of a third party before he or she gains access to the content.” [See Crookes v. Newton para. 30, emphasis added]

The Supreme Court of Canada relied upon an extensive body of law in coming to this conclusion, including constitutional principles stemming from the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Justice Abella, writing for the majority, found that the implementation of the Charter, together with technological advancement, had increased the prevalence of freedom of expression considerations in defamation cases:

“Pre-Charter approaches to defamation law in Canada largely leaned towards protecting reputation. That began to change when the Court modified the “honest belief” element to the fair comment defence in WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, 2008 SCC 40, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420, and when, in Grant, the Court developed a defence of responsible communication on matters of public interest. These cases recognize the importance of achieving a proper balance between protecting an individual’s reputation and the foundational role of freedom of expression in the development of democratic institutions and values (Grant, at para. 1; Hill, at para. 101) … Interpreting the publication rule to exclude mere references not only accords with a more sophisticated appreciation of Charter values, but also with the dramatic transformation in the technology of communications.” [See Crookes v. Newton para. 32, emphasis added]

 

  1. Like the defendant in Crookes v. Newton, Mr. Lemire did not write the content in question, nor did he promote or advertise it. He merely made it available for those who wished to engage in a private conversation or debate.
  2. In Crookes v. Yahoo, 2007 BCSC 1325, the BC Supreme Court found at paragraph 26 of its decision that “communication” of defamatory content takes place at the time such content is downloaded, not when it is uploaded to a web server:

“[26]   With respect to internet communications, the site of the alleged defamation is where the damage to reputation occurs: Dow Jones Co. Inc. v. Gutnick, (2002), 194 Aust. L.lR. 433 (H.C.); Barrick Gold Corp. v. Blanchard and Co., [2003] O.J. No. 5817 (S.C.). It is when a person downloads the impugned material from the internet that the damage to the reputation may be done, and it is at that time and place that the tort of defamation is committed.” [Emphasis added]

 

  1. Thus, it is clear that if the message causes group defamation (as set out in Section 13(1)), it is Warman’s download that committed it. The presence of hate propaganda on the internet does not necessarily affect the dignity and self-worth of target group members. Such material will only be seen by those who seek it out.

    Social Harms Associated with Hate Propaganda:

  2. Likewise, imposing punitive sanctions against the content of the internet is not rationally connected to the legislative objective of preventing the social harms associated with hate propaganda. There is no rational justification for prohibiting a person from making available an expression which is readily available to someone who seeks it elsewhere by the same means. If it is hate speech and readily available, imposing sanctions on a Canadian does not connect to or advance the prohibition of availability because an American source which is quite legal is just as available and beyond the reach of our law. This would be and is a ridiculous law against availability from a Canadian. It is equivalent to a codex of books prohibited to Catholics which are freely available to Protestants, with one serious exception – the Protestants can go to jail for making it available.
  3. The internet is huge, complex, repetitive, and passive unless sought out by the requesting recipient. Any and all of the content alleged against Marc Lemire is available from a wide range of other sources made available by Americans in America, where it is perfectly legal, protected by the First Amendment. (See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) in the U.S. Supreme Court where, by a 9-to-0 margin, the Court struck down the Minnesota hate law, a content-based restriction on freedom of expression. This case occurred after Taylor was decided.)
  4. It can never be a rational objective to punish the expression by Canadians of words, phrases, content, analysis, or opinions which are readily available from others who are not Canadians in the same place (the internet), at the same time, by the same means, and legally available to all other Canadians. This makes it illegal for a Canadian to make available to Canadians what is just as available to other Canadians from a foreign source, just as easily. Such cannot be a pressing and substantial concern, and is not rationally connected to the legislative objective of shielding vulnerable groups from the effects of hate propaganda. It would only be rationally connected if the prohibition had the effect of making the messages unavailable from any source.
  5. Likewise, the application of Section 13(1) to the internet is not proportional, but impractical, unfair, and based upon irrational considerations. This is because the same effect is as readily available from other sources on the internet. Further, the effects are not delivered by anyone to another against their will. It is totally irrational to punish expression because of the national origin of the speaker. It is more so to punish expression which is not communicated to anyone in Canada unless requested specifically by the pretended victim.
  6. In the recent case of Whatcott, the Supreme Court of Canada applied its previous reasoning in Taylor to a situation involving pamphlets distributed door-to-door. The court unanimously clarified that a legal inquiry into the issue of hate speech must focus on the likely effects of the hate speech in question:

“[52]                          An assessment of whether expression exposes a protected group to hatred must therefore include an evaluation of the likely effects of the expression on its audience. Would a reasonable person consider that the expression vilifying a protected group has the potential to lead to discrimination and other harmful effects? This assessment will depend largely on the context and circumstances of each case.

[53]                          For example, in the normal course of events, expression that targets a protected group in the context of satire, or news reports about hate speech perpetrated by someone else, would not likely constitute hate speech. Representations made in private settings would also not be captured by provisions prohibiting publication, display or broadcast of the expression, such as in s. 14(1)(b) of the Code.  It may also make a difference whether the expression contains a singular remark that comes close to violating the prohibition, or contains a multitude of or repeated, delegitimizing attacks.

[54]                          Dickson C.J. emphasized this need to focus on the effects of the expression in his reasons in Taylor.  He noted that “the purpose and impact of human rights codes is to prevent discriminatory effects rather than to stigmatize and punish those who discriminate” (p. 933 (emphasis added)). The focus of the prohibition against hate propaganda in s. 13(1) of the CHRA is “solely upon [its] likely effects” (p. 931). Dickson C.J. reasoned that the preoccupation with the discriminatory effects was understandable, given that systemic discrimination is more widespread than intentional discrimination. Tribunals must focus on the likely effects of impugned expression in order to achieve the preventive goals of anti-discrimination statutes.”

  1. In light of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Whatcott, it will be respectfully submitted that the application of Section 13(1) to the internet is not rationally connected to the prevention of the social harms of hate propaganda. It is indisputable that alleged hate propaganda of all kinds is available on the internet. Much of this material originates outside of Canada. Section 13(1) does nothing to prevent Canadians from making the choice to download hateful material, which many Canadians (including the complainant in this case) have done.
  2. The dissemination of hate propaganda on the internet is less likely to attract Canadians to its cause than it is to provoke critical assessment and response. Punitive sanctions against Canadians who make such content available do not make the propaganda less available or less attractive. Internet users have free reign to disagree and object to material they read on a website, and Mr. Lemire’s website (a discussion forum) was specifically designed with this purpose in mind. In any event, the prosecution of Canadians who merely make material available on the internet has no impact on the ability of other Canadians to download hateful material, and therefore no rational connection to preventing social harms caused by such material merely being posted.
  3. For the aforementioned reasons, it will be respectfully submitted that Section 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act, insofar as it applies to the internet, is not rationally connected to the objectives set out in Taylor, and is therefore not a “reasonable limit” to freedom of expression in accordance with Section 1 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
  4. In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that the Supreme Court in Taylor did not pronounce on the constitutionality of Section 13(1) in all contexts, but upheld it by the narrowest of margins using Section 1 of the Charter analysis in telephone answering machine context, where no response or debate is possible. Such analysis does not have any relevant applicability to the totally different context of the then-unforeseeable internet and is no longer valid in this context. Using the same Section 1 analysis and principles, Section 13(1) does not pass constitutional muster.

PART IV: STATEMENT OF ORDER SOUGHT

 

  1. The Canadian Association for Free Expression requests an order as follows:

    “A declaration that Section 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act, insofar as it relates to the internet, is an unreasonable violation of Section 2(b) of the Charter not saved by Section 1 thereof, and therefore inoperative pursuant to Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.”

 

 

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ___ day of May, 2013.

 

   

 

_______________________________

BARCLAY W. JOHNSON

Barrister & Solicitor

1027 Pandora Avenue

Victoria, BC V8V 3P6

 

Telephone:          (250) 418-3255

Fax:                      (250) 370-1655

Counsel for the Intervener

Canadian Association for Free Expression Inc.

 

 

Mark and Connie FournierDay 2 of the Baglow v. Smith & Fourniers Defamation Hearing

Baglow testifies and hearing delayed due to medical problems

 
March 25, 2014 OTTAWA:  Today is the second day of the pseudonymous defamation trial of “Dr Dawg” vs “Peter O’Donnell”.  For background on the case and my comments on the first day, see my blog posting here: http://blog.freedomsite.org/2014/03/day-1-of-baglow-v-smith-fourniers.html
 

For the entire day, “Dr Dawg” a.k.a. John Baglow gave testimony about his defamation lawsuit and introduced documents that form the case he is presenting to the court.  The hearing today was significantly shorted due to an apparent medical situation which effected one of the main parties. After the morning break, one of the court staff made a comment about the health (high blood pressure / stroke potential?) of one of the main parties.  While the person insisted he was fine and could proceed with the case, the court staff seemed to react that the medical situation needed to be addressed immediately.  After a short confab with the lawyers and self-represented parties, it was ordered that the trial should stop immediately and could reconvene after a 2+ hour break at 2:00pm.  On the bright side for the affected party, I am a former medic and would intervene if I saw the individual go down. J

Day 2 – “Dr Dawg” Testifies – In-Chief.
 
The day started off with Peter Burnet calling his witness to the stand “Dr. Dawg”.
 

The Fourniers, Connie & Mark, Battling for the Rights of Bulletin Board Hosts
 
In a brief series of questions, Burnet asked “Dr Dawg” to give some biographical information.  “Dr Dawg” is 67 years old and lives in Ottawa.  He attended several Universities in Canada and in Scotland and has a BA and Masters in Literature.  For years “Dr Dawg” was employed by the Social Sciences and Research Council as a grant officer.  While working at SSRC, “Dr Dawg” became interested in labour issues and was elected to a position with the Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC) where he was a vice-president until 2003.  In 2003 “Dr Dawg” went into a consulting business called ‘First Write”.
 
Dr Dawg” describes himself as “a man of the left” and in his youth was a member of the NDP Youth wing.  After that, he “gravitated towards the Communist Party and was a member until the Czechoslovakian invasion”, when he left the party and rejoined the NDP.  He is a card carrying member of the NDP, with the exception of a couple of years when he was upset with the party and “ripped up his NDP membership card”.
 
The Blogosphere is made up of “millions of blogs … maybe hundreds of millions of postings”.  On his own blog called “Dawgs Blawg” he receives “up to one thousand unique visits a day”.  “Comments are not moderated on my blog and go directly up”.  “I chose not to moderate my blog” but on occasions has had to ban “up to 30 people” for postings he finds offensive.  On his website “I use Site Meter to track visitors.  I can see new and returning visitors.  I can see the IP Address”.
 
“In 2005 I decided to set up a blog about left wing issues and perspectives”. And as part of that he has “three co-bloggers on the site”, though the number of co-bloggers has fluctuated over time.  He named the site “Dawgs Blawg; because I like dogs and didn’t want to take it that seriously.  It is a cartoonish name”.
 
“I welcome comments from people with different and divergent opinions”, which includes “Dr Dawgs” own lawyer – Peter Burnet who admitted to being a poster on the Dawg’s Blawg website.
 
“I really enjoy the cut and thrust of debate” says “Dr Dawg”, and over the years has been officially served twice with defamation for his blog.  The first case apparently involved a mistaken name on an article he wrote.  “Dr Dawg” was served with a libel notice, and ended up removing the post and publishing a retraction.
 
The second defamation complaint came from Ezra Levant, who served a libel notice for comments made surrounding a law society complaint where it was claimed to have been upheld by the law society.  “Dr Dawg” removed some of the comments and apologized to Levant.  “Dr Dawg” claims that “Levants lawyers then apparently wanted to remove other allegedly defamatory material which I did not comply with or remove”.  Levant did not follow up on the lawsuit after that point.
 
In regards to the website FreeDominion, “Dr Dawg” describes them as “radically conservative and pretty extreme.  Use of the ‘N’ word.  Muslim bashing, homophobia and an unpleasant place”.  The website “champions the rights of white nationalists, holocaust deniers, neo-nazis, white supremacists, homophobes and supports the right to unrestrained hate in society”.  Over the years “Dr Dawg” posted “once or twice on FreeDominion”.
 
In terms of speech restrictions, “Dr Dawg” says that “I strongly supported Section 13 and was sad to see it go”.  That is a reference to Section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, Canada’s internet censorship legislation, which was repealed by the government last year (See more on Section 13 @ http://www.stopsection13.com)
 
Dr Dawg” talked about a posting entitled ‘Freedom of Speech’ which I think was a posting on the FreeDominion message board.  In his testimony “Dr Dawg” made some sort of reference to a “technical relationship” between Connie Fournier and myself.  I did not understand his testimony on this point or what was meant by “technical relationship”.  I believe it has something to do with computers, and perhaps an affidavit from a computer expert which was introduced in my Section 13 hearing (Bernard Klatt).   Perhaps we’ll know more on this point during the cross-examination tomorrow.
 
In reference to Connie Fournier, one of the owner/admins of the FreeDominion website, “Dr Dawg” posted a few times that she was the “FreeDominatrix”.  He was sorry and “sometimes I can’t help myself being uncivil to the uncivilized” and was “mocking her for a hyper-aggressive posture”.  “There is a hostility between the Fourniers and myself”.
 

Traitor = Not Defamatory.  Vocal Supporter of Taliban = Defamation

Dr Dawgs” testimony then centered on why he did not sue Roger Smith for calling him a traitor on Dawgs Blawg, but did sue over the Taliban comments.  This gets a bit convoluted for me, since “Dr Dawg” was going very fast, and I just managed to write down smaller points of what he said.  But basically the “traitor” comment written by “Peter O’Donnell” was “incoherent” and that “the comment self-destructs” due to its context.
 
The statement about “Dr Dawg” being a more vocal supporter of the Taliban “was a long and rambling post about a different topic” and when the post mentions “Dr Dawg”, “there was no context to the statement” which made it defamatory.  “Dr Dawg” took the comments on the Taliban to be similar to calling him “an enemy agent”.
 
From there “Dr Dawg” moved on and discussed some posting he had made on the Internet where he was critical of the Taliban and called them “an odious bunch of people” that are a “murderous band of thugs” and their “cult of religious insanity”.  While “Dr Dawg” had been critical of the Taliban, he was opposed to Canada’s intervention in the war in Afghanistan for a variety of reasons which included that the Taliban was originally supported by the US government in their war against the Soviets.  “I don’t support another foreign intervention, when multiple foreign interventions are what originally caused the problems in the region”.
 
After that “Dr Dawg” moved on to some other commentary, where apparently a prominent member of Canada’s B’nai Brith (Harry Abrams) referred to him as being Anti-Semitic for his comments on the State of Israel. “Dr Dawg” stated that he is “quite critical of Israeli treatment of Palestinians and Bedouin’s” and in terms of “Israeli Apartheid” he says that “it is unfair to label Israel as an Apartheid state, but there are some apartheid like elements in the Israel’s treatment of Palestinians and Bedouins”.
 
The day came to a close with a series of questions by Burnet on the context of the Blogosphere.  “Dr Dawg” testified that “context is important” and that “the political blogosphere could be characterized as polemical”.  But “we should not allow plain falsehood.  And the internet does not make it ok to lie online”.
 
Stay tuned for the cross-examination tomorrow of “Dr Dawg”.
 
 

: http://blog.freedomsite.org/2014/03/day-2-of-baglow-v-smith-fourniers.html

Federal Court of Appeals Rules Sec. 13 (Internet Censorship) is Constitutional & Penalties Are Back

Federal Court of Appeals Rules Sec. 13 (Internet Censorship) is Constitutional & Penalties Are Back

The Federal Court of Appeals has confirmed again that the highest courts of this land are dominated by Cultural Marxists. Free speech took another battering. The issue was whether Sec. 13 (Internet censorship) of the Canadian Human Rights Act is constitutional. After years of protest. Parliament repealed this odious piece of censorship in June, 2013.

Marc Lemire and his Freedomsite had been the victims of a Sec. 13 complaint filed by serial complainant Richard Warman. The case was fought for six years, resulting in the only victory under Sec. 13 (truth is no defence, intent is no defence ( in September, 2009, when member Athanasios Hadjis essentially found Sec. 13 unconstitutional as it imposed financial penalties and when the Supreme Court upheld a milder version of the law in Taylor, in 1990, they did so, in part, because it was remedial. The Canadian Human Rights Commission sought judicial review (in Federal Court). The hearing was in December, 2011. The Federal Court ruled the law constitutional but agreed that the penalties were out. Marc Lemire then appealed to the Federal Court, which heard the case on November 14.

 

The three judges ruled Sec. 13 is constitutional and the financial penalties are back in.

 

In his judgement, Mr. Justice Evans, closely followed the Supreme Court in its decision in Whatcott, the case of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission fining William Whatcott for distributing leaflets critical of homosexuals some 13 years ago. The Whatcott decision was a viciously anti-Christian ruling that was classic Cultural Communism. The Frankfurt School of communists, which is the evil genius behind political correctness (radical feminism, the homosexual agenda, the mis-named “civil rights movement”) is based on a radical view of “equality.” All people are equal, say the true believers. Of course, when that’s not the way things

work out, then laws must be used to impose equality. It is from this view, for instance, that Canada’s nutty Supreme Court decided that the traditional definition of marriage is out: if a man can marry a woman, then a man should be able to marry a man.

 

Let’s look at some of this decision’s reasoning, as ideology trumps freedom of speech and even logic.

 

In Mr. Lemire’s submissions and in Mr. Hadjis’s decision, the conduct of the Commission was very much in question. Contrary to the approach endorsed by the Supreme Court in Taylor, the Commission and Mr. Warman refused repeated requests for mediation.

 

“In particular, the Tribunal noted, unlike complaints of other kinds of discriminatory

practices, the Commission had rarely attempted to mediate section 13 complaints. Instead, it

referred the vast majority of them to the Tribunal for adjudication, and regularly sought

compensatory awards and penalties. Moreover, the Commission often continued to process

complaints after impugned material had been removed from the website on which it was posted.

Indeed, in the present case, Mr Lemire had removed most of the material before he was notified of

Mr Warman’s complaints, and promptly removed “AIDS Secrets” from Freedomsite after learning

that it was the subject of a complaint to the Commission. Further, the Tribunal found, the

Commission had not attempted to resolve the complaint by conciliation.”

 

But, none of that mattered to the Federal Appeals Court. Perhaps, the overworked thought police at the Canadian Human Rights Commission just didn’t have time for mediation or to notice that Mr. Lemire had swiftly removed all the impugned posts. If mediation were the approach of the Human Rights Commission, as the SCC found in Taylor, surely this should have mattered, but no!

 

” After finding that the Tribunal had no authority to examine the conduct of the Commission for the purpose of determining Mr Lemire’s constitutional challenge to section 13, the Judge considered whether the Court could examine the manner in which the Commission administered section 13 when determining whether it is a reasonable limit on section 2(b) rights and thus saved by section 1. He held that the way in which Commission exercised its statutory administrative powers was not relevant to the validity of section 13.
 Nor do I accept that the effects of the Commission’s conduct have displaced the valid

objectives of section 13, namely the prevention of discrimination against vulnerable groups on prohibited grounds. Conciliation is not the only constitutionally permissible manner in which the Commission may approach the enforcement of the CHRA in general and of section 13 in particular.

 

 Because of the nature and relatively small number of section 13 complaints, as well as the

extreme kinds of speech proscribed, I agree with the Judge (at paras. 63-64) that the Commission cannot reasonably be criticized for being reluctant, in this and other section 13 complaints, to devote  scarce resources to mediation and conciliation, or to accept offers to take down offending material

voluntarily. “

 

Too bad for Lemire if his rights to due process were trampled on.

 

The Federal Court of Appeals leaned heavily on Mr. Justice Rothstein’s decision in Whatcott. The wording reflects the Frankfurt School’s conspiracy theory of reality: there are dominant majorities — White and usually Christian and male — oppressing “vulnerable” minorities, who must be given special protection by “human” (actually, special) rights legislation.

Here’s the argument:

Writing for the Court in Whatcott, Justice Rothstein summarized (at para. 59) the

 

principal elements of hate speech provisions in human rights legislation that provide the degree of objectivity required by the Charter.

 

… [W]here the term ‘hatred’ is used in the context of a prohibition of expression in

human rights legislation, it should be applied objectively to determine whether a

reasonable person, aware of the context and circumstances, would view the

expression as likely to expose a person or group to detestation and vilification on the

basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination.

 

In other words, “[t]ribunals must focus on the likely effects of impugned expression in

order to achieve the preventive goals of anti-discrimination statutes” (at para. 54).  … Addressing the objectives of hate speech provisions in human rights legislation, Justice  Rothstein said (at para. 71):

 

When people are vilified as blameworthy or undeserving, it is easier to justify

 discriminatory treatment. The objective of … [hate speech provisions] may be understood as reducing the harmful effects and social costs of discrimination by tackling certain causes of discriminatory activity.

 

[Justice Rothstein noted (at para. 75) that a “particularly insidious aspect of hate speech” is that it effectively blocks the target group from responding. It does this not only by attempting to marginalize the group so that their reply will be ignored: it also forces the group to argue for their basic humanity or social standing,  as a precondition to participating in the deliberative aspects of democracy.

 

 

 Finally, Justice Rothstein observed (at para. 120) that because of its narrow definition, hate speech constitutes ‘an extreme and marginal type of expression’. It ‘contributes little to the values underlying freedom of expression and … its restriction is therefore easier to justify’ under section 1. “

 

So, “hate speech”, because the Court doesn’t like its message, is not a legitimate form of “freedom of expression.” And, of course, as even a high school student can see, then there really isn’t FREEDOM of expression. Note the utterly unproven conspiracy theory that a [posting on Marc Lemire’s website critical of homosexuals intimidated or silenced homosexuals. In fact, it was busybody Richard Warman, not homosexuals, who complained against Marc Lemire. During the years this case has inched through a tribunal and on to the Federal Court, homosexuals have gained the right of same sex marriage, many Canadian cities are flying rainbow flags in support of supposedly aggrieved homosexuals in Russia, several provinces have imposed militantly pro-homosexual curricula even on little grade school children and Canada’s present “Conservative” government is among the most “gay” friendly ever. There is NO objective evidence that Kevin Strom’s article on The Freedomsite, long since removed, ever intimidated or silenced anybody.

 

The person who faces silencing is Mr. Lemire!

 

The Court has no trouble with the fact that neither intent nor truth is a defence:

 

“Hate speech constitutes an extreme form of expression of limited scope that fosters a

climate in which unlawful discrimination may be regarded as acceptable and flourish. It does this by demeaning, vilifying, and marginalizing groups of individuals who share characteristics that constitute a prohibited ground of discrimination under the CHRA. Since hate speech contributes  little to the values underlying free speech, its proscription is fairly easily justifiable under section 1. Hate speech constitutes an extreme form of expression of limited scope that fosters a climate in which unlawful discrimination may be regarded as acceptable and flourish. It does this by demeaning, vilifying, and marginalizing groups of individuals who share characteristics that constitute a prohibited ground of discrimination under the CHRA. Since hate speech contributes  little to the values underlying free speech, its proscription is fairly easily justifiable under section 1. “

 

As to penalties, only the African Canadian Legal Clinic, represented by two lawyers who were, well, decidedly un-African or Black, wanted the penalties restored. The Federal Court of Appeals ruled: “I agree with the Judge that it is not constitutionally permissible for human rights legislation, to include a sanction designed to impose a punishment that expresses society’s moral opprobrium of the conduct of the wilful communicator of hate speech. ”

It doesn’t matter: Impose a punishment anyway and call it something else:

 

” The Supreme Court recognized for the first time in Whatcott that the imposition of a

financial sanction was a constitutionally permissible remedy for breach of a hate speech provision in human rights legislation. Thus, Justice Rothstein said (at para. 149): As in tort law, an award of damages made pursuant to the Code is characterized as  compensatory, not punitive, and is directed at compensating the victim. However, the circumstances in which a compensation award will be merited should be rare and will often involve repeat litigants who refuse to participate in a conciliatory approach. ” So a financial award is not “punitive”?

 

The plain meaning of English is being bent like a pretzel.” Since subsection 53(3) does not in terms require proof of loss by the victim, it is not compensatory in precisely the same way as paragraph 31.4(b) of the Saskatchewan Code which applies when the hate speech caused the injured person to suffer with respect to feeling, dignity or self-respect. Nonetheless, when applied to breaches of section 13, subsection 53(3) can be regarded as compensating victims specifically identified in hate speech for the damage presumptively caused  to their “sense of human dignity and belonging to the community at large” which Whatcott

recognized (at para. 81) that hate speech causes.  In my view, when the penalty provisions are considered in the context of the objectives of the CHRA and its remedial scheme, they are not properly characterized as penal in nature.”

 

To compensate identified people “for the damage presumptively caused to their ‘sense of dignity’”? Note the weasel word “presumptively”. Thus, no real damage or injury has to be proven at all.

So, where does this decision leave freedom of speech? On one level, the ruling of the Federal Court of Appeals will effect only Mr. Lemire who now faces a sentencing hearing, should he not appeal. As Sec. 13 has been repealed, the Federal Court of Appeals decision is largely moot. However, and this is a big however, as Sec. 13 has been ruled constitutional, another government, say Liberal of NDP, could reintroduce it. And there lies the danger.

CAFÉ has been an intervener and has supported Marc Lemire throughout his 11-year ordeal. CAFÉ’s submissions were studiously ignored by the federal Court of Appeal. For good reason. CAFÉ reminded the Court of the testimony before the Tribunal of Professor Michael Persinger. The eminent neuropsychologist sank the leaky scientific ship on which all this Frankfurt School “vulnerable minority” theory is based. His expert testimony testified that people subjective to “aversive speech” (not the emotional “hate speech”  label, but views contrary to or critical of their own group) do not fall apart in fear, withdrawal or alienation: they either reject the criticism as crazy or laughable, or fight back and argue – both healthy reactions. The Court ignored the submissions that their ideology that forms the justification for the erasing of free speech through Canada’s various “anti-hate” laws is as utterly without scientific basis as the views of the flat earth society.

Paul Fromm

Director

CANADIAN ASSOCIATION FOR FREE EXPRESSION

Photo: Federal Court of Appeals Rules Sec. 13 (Internet Censorship) is Constitutional & Penalties Are Back

The Federal Court of Appeals has confirmed again that the highest courts of this land are dominated by Cultural Marxists. Free speech took another battering. The issue was whether Sec. 13 (Internet censorship) of the Canadian Human Rights Act is constitutional. After years of protest. Parliament repealed this odious piece of censorship in June, 2013.

Marc Lemire and his Freedomsite had been the victims of a Sec. 13 complaint filed by serial complainant Richard Warman. The case was fought for six years, resulting in the only victory under Sec. 13 (truth is no defence, intent is no defence ( in September, 2009, when member Athanasios Hadjis essentially found Sec. 13 unconstitutional as it imposed financial penalties and when the Supreme Court upheld a milder version of the law in Taylor, in 1990, they did so, in part, because it was remedial. The Canadian Human Rights Commission sought judicial review (in Federal Court). The hearing was in December, 2011. The Federal Court ruled the law constitutional but agreed that the penalties were out. Marc Lemire then appealed to the Federal Court, which heard the case on November 14.

The three judges ruled Sec. 13 is constitutional and the financial penalties are back in.

In his judgement, Mr. Justice Evans, closely followed the Supreme Court in its decision in Whatcott, the case of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission fining William Whatcott for distributing leaflets critical of homosexuals some 13 years ago. The Whatcott decision was a viciously anti-Christian ruling that was classic Cultural Communism. The Frankfurt School of communists, which is the evil genius behind political correctness (radical feminism, the homosexual agenda, the mis-named "civil rights movement") is based on a radical view of "equality." All people are equal, say the true believers. Of course, when that's not the way things 

work out, then laws must be used to impose equality. It is from this view, for instance, that Canada's nutty Supreme Court decided that the traditional definition of marriage is out: if a man can marry a woman, then a man should be able to marry a man.

Let's look at some of this decision's reasoning, as ideology trumps freedom of speech and even logic.

In Mr. Lemire's submissions and in Mr. Hadjis's decision, the conduct of the Commission was very much in question. Contrary to the approach endorsed by the Supreme Court in Taylor, the Commission and Mr. Warman refused repeated requests for mediation.

“In particular, the Tribunal noted, unlike complaints of other kinds of discriminatory 

practices, the Commission had rarely attempted to mediate section 13 complaints. Instead, it 

referred the vast majority of them to the Tribunal for adjudication, and regularly sought 

compensatory awards and penalties. Moreover, the Commission often continued to process 

complaints after impugned material had been removed from the website on which it was posted. 

Indeed, in the present case, Mr Lemire had removed most of the material before he was notified of 

Mr Warman’s complaints, and promptly removed “AIDS Secrets” from Freedomsite after learning 

that it was the subject of a complaint to the Commission. Further, the Tribunal found, the 

Commission had not attempted to resolve the complaint by conciliation."

But, none of that mattered to the Federal Appeals Court. Perhaps, the overworked thought police at the Canadian Human Rights Commission just didn't have time for mediation or to notice that Mr. Lemire had swiftly removed all the impugned posts. If mediation were the approach of the Human Rights Commission, as the SCC found in Taylor, surely this should have mattered, but no!

" After finding that the Tribunal had no authority to examine the conduct of the Commission for the purpose of determining Mr Lemire’s constitutional challenge to section 13, the Judge considered whether the Court could examine the manner in which the Commission administered section 13 when determining whether it is a reasonable limit on section 2(b) rights and thus saved by section 1. He held that the way in which Commission exercised its statutory administrative powers was not relevant to the validity of section 13. 

  Nor do I accept that the effects of the Commission’s conduct have displaced the valid 

objectives of section 13, namely the prevention of discrimination against vulnerable groups on prohibited grounds. Conciliation is not the only constitutionally permissible manner in which the Commission may approach the enforcement of the CHRA in general and of section 13 in particular. 

 Because of the nature and relatively small number of section 13 complaints, as well as the 

extreme kinds of speech proscribed, I agree with the Judge (at paras. 63-64) that the Commission cannot reasonably be criticized for being reluctant, in this and other section 13 complaints, to devote  scarce resources to mediation and conciliation, or to accept offers to take down offending material 

voluntarily. " 

Too bad for Lemire if his rights to due process were trampled on.

The Federal Court of Appeals leaned heavily on Mr. Justice Rothstein's decision in Whatcott. The wording reflects the Frankfurt School's conspiracy theory of reality: there are dominant majorities -- White and usually Christian and male -- oppressing "vulnerable" minorities, who must be given special protection by "human" (actually, special) rights legislation.

Here's the argument:

"Writing for the Court in Whatcott, Justice Rothstein summarized (at para. 59) the 

principal elements of hate speech provisions in human rights legislation that provide the degree of objectivity required by the Charter. 

… [W]here the term ‘hatred’ is used in the context of a prohibition of expression in 

human rights legislation, it should be applied objectively to determine whether a 

reasonable person, aware of the context and circumstances, would view the 

expression as likely to expose a person or group to detestation and vilification on the 

basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination. 

In other words, “[t]ribunals must focus on the likely effects of impugned expression in 

order to achieve the preventive goals of anti-discrimination statutes” (at para. 54).  ... Addressing the objectives of hate speech provisions in human rights legislation, Justice  Rothstein said (at para. 71): 

When people are vilified as blameworthy or undeserving, it is easier to justify 

 discriminatory treatment. The objective of … [hate speech provisions] may be understood as reducing the harmful effects and social costs of discrimination by tackling certain causes of discriminatory activity. 

[Justice Rothstein noted (at para. 75) that a “particularly insidious aspect of hate speech” is that it effectively blocks the target group from responding. It does this not only by attempting to marginalize the group so that their reply will be ignored: it also forces the group to argue for their basic humanity or social standing,  as a precondition to participating in the deliberative aspects of democracy. 

 Finally, Justice Rothstein observed (at para. 120) that because of its narrow definition, hate speech constitutes ‘an extreme and marginal type of expression’. It ‘contributes little to the values underlying freedom of expression and … its restriction is therefore easier to justify’ under section 1. "

So, “hate speech”, because the Court doesn’t like its message, is not a legitimate form of “freedom of expression.” And, of course, as even a high school student can see, then there really isn’t FREEDOM of expression. Note the utterly unproven conspiracy theory that a [posting on Marc Lemire's website critical of homosexuals intimidated or silenced homosexuals. In fact, it was busybody Richard Warman, not homosexuals, who complained against Marc Lemire. During the years this case has inched through a tribunal and on to the Federal Court, homosexuals have gained the right of same sex marriage, many Canadian cities are flying rainbow flags in support of supposedly aggrieved homosexuals in Russia, several provinces have imposed militantly pro-homosexual curricula even on little grade school children and Canada's present "Conservative" government is among the most "gay" friendly ever. There is NO objective evidence that Kevin Strom's article on The Freedomsite, long since removed, ever intimidated or silenced anybody.

The person who faces silencing is Mr. Lemire!

The Court has no trouble with the fact that neither intent nor truth is a defence:

"Hate speech constitutes an extreme form of expression of limited scope that fosters a 

climate in which unlawful discrimination may be regarded as acceptable and flourish. It does this by demeaning, vilifying, and marginalizing groups of individuals who share characteristics that constitute a prohibited ground of discrimination under the CHRA. Since hate speech contributes  little to the values underlying free speech, its proscription is fairly easily justifiable under section 1. Hate speech constitutes an extreme form of expression of limited scope that fosters a climate in which unlawful discrimination may be regarded as acceptable and flourish. It does this by demeaning, vilifying, and marginalizing groups of individuals who share characteristics that constitute a prohibited ground of discrimination under the CHRA. Since hate speech contributes  little to the values underlying free speech, its proscription is fairly easily justifiable under section 1. "

As to penalties, only the African Canadian Legal Clinic, represented by two lawyers who were, well, decidedly un-African or Black, wanted the penalties restored. The Federal Court of Appeals ruled: "I agree with the Judge that it is not constitutionally permissible for human rights legislation, to include a sanction designed to impose a punishment that expresses society’s moral opprobrium of the conduct of the wilful communicator of hate speech. " 

It doesn't matter: Impose a punishment anyway and call it something else:

" The Supreme Court recognized for the first time in Whatcott that the imposition of a 

financial sanction was a constitutionally permissible remedy for breach of a hate speech provision in human rights legislation. Thus, Justice Rothstein said (at para. 149): As in tort law, an award of damages made pursuant to the Code is characterized as  compensatory, not punitive, and is directed at compensating the victim. However, the circumstances in which a compensation award will be merited should be rare and will often involve repeat litigants who refuse to participate in a conciliatory approach. " So a financial award is not "punitive"? 

The plain meaning of English is being bent like a pretzel.” Since subsection 53(3) does not in terms require proof of loss by the victim, it is not compensatory in precisely the same way as paragraph 31.4(b) of the Saskatchewan Code which applies when the hate speech caused the injured person to suffer with respect to feeling, dignity or self-respect. Nonetheless, when applied to breaches of section 13, subsection 53(3) can be regarded as compensating victims specifically identified in hate speech for the damage presumptively caused  to their “sense of human dignity and belonging to the community at large” which Whatcott 

recognized (at para. 81) that hate speech causes.  In my view, when the penalty provisions are considered in the context of the objectives of the CHRA and its remedial scheme, they are not properly characterized as penal in nature."

To compensate identified people “for the damage presumptively caused to their ‘sense of dignity’”? Note the weasel word “presumptively”. Thus, no real damage or injury has to be proven at all.

So, where does this decision leave freedom of speech? On one level, the ruling of the Federal Court of Appeals will effect only Mr. Lemire who now faces a sentencing hearing, should he not appeal. As Sec. 13 has been repealed, the Federal Court of Appeals decision is largely moot. However, and this is a big however, as Sec. 13 has been ruled constitutional, another government, say Liberal of NDP, could reintroduce it. And there lies the danger.

CAFÉ has been an intervener and has supported Marc Lemire throughout his 11-year ordeal. CAFÉ’s submissions were studiously ignored by the federal Court of Appeal. For good reason. CAFÉ reminded the Court of the testimony before the Tribunal of Professor Michael Persinger. The eminent neuropsychologist sank the leaky scientific ship on which all this Frankfurt School “vulnerable minority” theory is based. His expert testimony testified that people subjective to “aversive speech” (not the emotional “hate speech”  label, but views contrary to or critical of their own group) do not fall apart in fear, withdrawal or alienation: they either reject the criticism as crazy or laughable, or fight back and argue – both healthy reactions. The Court ignored the submissions that their ideology that forms the justification for the erasing of free speech through Canada’s various “anti-hate” laws is as utterly without scientific basis as the views of the flat earth society.

Paul Fromm

Director

CANADIAN ASSOCIATION FOR FREE EXPRESSION

Censorship Victim Marc Lemire Comments

The court is an insane asylum!  Stay as far away from it as you can, if you want any “justice”!

 The three Appeals court fossils upheld Section 13, and REINSTATED the penalty provisions, although all the main parties agreed it was unconstitutional!  The only party who wanted it was the “African-Canadian” legal clinic, whose two religio-ethnic lawyers were distinctly non-“African Canadian”.

Those judges were rubbing their hands together when the “African-Canadian” legal clinic made submissions about how the penalty provision is not actually a penalty.  And the Judges were their argument, almost verbatim, in this decision.

I guess this means… back to the Tribunal for me. For my penalty/non-“penalty” phase, where they slap me with a lifetime speech ban and possibly thousands in penalties/non-”penalties”.

Disgusting!

-Marc

 

Censorship Victim Marc Lemire Comments

 

The court is an insane asylum!  Stay as far away from it as you can, if you want any “justice”!

 The three Appeals court fossils upheld Section 13, and REINSTATED the penalty provisions, although all the main parties agreed it was unconstitutional!  The only party who wanted it was the “African-Canadian” legal clinic, whose two religio-ethnic lawyers were distinctly non-“African Canadian”.

 

Those judges were rubbing their hands together when the “African-Canadian” legal clinic made submissions about how the penalty provision is not actually a penalty.  And the Judges were their argument, almost verbatim, in this decision.

 

I guess this means… back to the Tribunal for me. For my penalty/non-“penalty” phase, where they slap me with a lifetime speech ban and possibly thousands in penalties/non-”penalties”.

 

 

Disgusting!

 

-Marc

Judges Reserve in Lemire Appeal Challenging Constitutionality of Sec. 13

Judges Reserve in Lemire Appeal Challenging Constitutionality of Sec. 13

TORONTO, November 14, 2013. The now repealed Sec. 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act should be found to be unconstitutional, as well, Marc Lemire, victim of a 10-year long battle with Richard Warman, argued this morning. Supported by interveners, the Canadian Association for Free Expression and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Barbara Kulaszka, Mr. Lemire’s erstwhile lawyer insisted: The Canadian Human Rights Act “was a statute designed to help little people against big government or corporations, but the Act’s Sec. 13 has hit little people having a beer and posting on the Internet.” Three Federal Court of Appeals judges reserved and retired to mull over their opinion

“The fact Parliament has repealed Sec. 13 should be taken into account,” Miss Kulaszka argued. Before penalties, now ruled unconstitutional were added in 1998, and, until Parliament, in 2001, legislated that Sec. 13 applied to the Internet, this section was largely unused. Interestingly, she added, “it has been used primarily by one man (Richard Warman), a White male, not the minorities” it was said to protect.”

In almost every case, “Richard Warman and the Canadian Human Rights Commission had joint submissions and always wanted penalties” assessed against the victims. In Mr. Lemire’s case, they originally sought a $7,500 penalty.”

Sec. 13, she argued, “is an anomaly within the Canadian Human Rights Act.” Most complaints under other sections of the Act result in settlements. “Until the Lemire case, there was a 100 per cent conviction under Sec. 13.” The Act, she added, “was designed to help little people against government or Crown corporations. However, Sec. 13 hits little people having a beer and posting their ideas on the Internet.”

Mr. Warman, she reminded the three judges hearing the appeal, never contacted Mr. Lemire about the Freedomsite message board that he complained about. By the time Mr. Lemire was served with the complaint, the message board had already been taken down. “The message board was taken down in early 2004. The complaint came in March 2004,” but proceeded nonetheless.

Mr. Lemire took down all six specific articles in the Warman complaint. “I wrote to the Commission and said all the impugned articles had been removed, but I received no reply,” Miss Kulaszka recalled. “Instead they started hunting for more material.”

The Internet, she explained, “is very different from a telephone answering machine.” Telephone messages were the original target of Sec. 13. “Accusations of ‘hate’ carry incredible stigma. It is not the equivalent in the public eye of the accusation your business failed to provide a ramp for the handicapped,” she added.

“The Internet is loved by the people but feared by the courts. Maybe, it’s generational. The Internet is empowering and people can talk back. Perhaps, Karen Mock testifying for the League for Human Rights of B’nai Brith in this matter put it best when she said education was the best way to fight ‘hate.'”

Sec. 13 should be ruled unconstitutional so that “ordinary people can self publish on the Internet, argue back and forth, and not have to have a lawyer present,” she concluded.

Barclay Johnson, a Victoria lawyer, representing the Canadian Association for Free Expression, reminded the appeals judges that, in their ruling on Keegstra and Taylor (which upheld the old version of Sec. 13), “the Supreme Court of Canada did not have the benefit of expert scientific evidence” that was led in the Lemire case “which discredited the scientific justification for ‘hate laws’; namely, the supposed dire effects on minorities of so-called “hate propaganda.”

CAFE’s lawyer Barclay Johnson of Victoria

The Court relied on Frederick Kaufman’s “basically Freudian analysis. His report had formed part of the Cohen Report on Hate Propaganda.” In this case, the defence led the expert evidence of Dr. Michael Persinger who exposed “the inaccurate methodology of Kaufmann. Persinger said:’I don’t use terms like ‘hate’. I use the tem ‘aversive stimuli. ‘Hate’ is a subjective term or label. The term ‘hate’ is arbitrary and highly subjective. Persinger’s evidence was not available to the Supreme Court in reaching their recent decision in Whatcott. The psychological field has changed,” Mr. Johnson added. The Court had relied on what we now know to be junk science.

Mr. Lemire’s Freedomsite “was not a public communication. Someone had to go looking for it. Mr. Warman wasn’t just walking down the street and saw the Freedomsite. In Crooks and Newton, the Supreme Court found that people using a hyperlink are involved in a private conversation. Hyperlinks are like a reference to material. They indicate that something exists,” he explained, “but you have to make the choice to go and call it up. Mr. Warman went looking for evidence of ‘hate’. That method of getting information is private. In this case, Mr. Warman was going to websites in order to be offended,” he added. “Mr. Warman did not go to a Canadian website but to one {the Freedomsite] hosted in the U.S.”

Concluding, Mr. Johnson said, “for Mr. Lemire to be responsible for everything uploaded to a website outside the country is unfair.”

Predicting the outcome of the appeal is perilous but the three presiding justices seemed to perk up when the two very pale lawyers — are there no Negro attrorneys? — speaking on behalf of the African Canadian Legal Clinic extolled the importance of penalties (which Judge Mosley had ruled unconstitutional).

We Won! Section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act is Repealed!

We Won! Section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act is Repealed!
Dear Free Speech Supporter:
Late this afternoon, an ugly piece of tyranny bit the dust. Section 13 (Internet censorship) of the Canadian Human Rights Act was repealed. Bill C-304, introduced by the courageous Brian Storseth of Alberta, won approval of the House of Commons in June, 2012. It received Third and final Reading in the Senate today and, then,  Royal Assent.
Thanks to all the MPs, Senators and, most of all, the many free speech letter writers across this country. It has been a long fight. Marc Lemire deserves special credit for his ferocious fight which, on September 2, 2009, resulted in a Canadian Human Rights Tribunal ruling Sec. 13, essentially,  unconstitutional.
However, we cannot rest on our laurels.
We usually don’t quote or acknowledge the anonymous smear artists at Anti-Racist Canada. After all, who goes around trying to answer graffiti on a washroom wall? [“Call Susie for a good time — 403 -777-7777” “No, Susie is no fun.”]
However, in their sour report on the partial defeat of censorship, ARC, which, we know, has sinister connections in Ottawa observes:
And it is of note that while it is the current government who passed the legislation, there’s nothing that says a future government might not reinstate Section 13 given that it had been deemed constitutional both in 1990 and more recently in the Whatcott case.
Time will tell and we are very patient. In the meantime, we’ll see how things play out.”
The Federal Court overturned most of the decision in the Lemire case and upheld the constitutionality — minus the financial penalties — of Sec. 13. This ruling is now being appealed to the Federal Court and CAFE is in the thick of the fray as an intervener. Note the threat that a future government — NDP, Liberal? — might reintroduce Sec. 13. Don’t kid yourself, having read some of the Senate speeches on the repeal of Sec. 13, I can assure you censorship and thought control still have some powerful pals in Ottawa.
Paul Fromm
Director
CANADIAN ASSOCIATION FOR FREE EXPRESSION
Photo: We Won! Section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act is Repealed!

Dear Free Speech Supporter:

Late this afternoon, an ugly piece of tyranny bit the dust. Section 13 (Internet censorship) of the Canadian Human Rights Act was repealed. Bill C-304, introduced by the courageous Brian Storseth of Alberta, won approval of the House of Commons in June, 2012. It received Third and final Reading in the Senate today and, then,  Royal Assent.

Thanks to all the MPs, Senators and, most of all, the many free speech letter writers across this country. It has been a long fight. Marc Lemire deserves special credit for his ferocious fight which, on September 2, 2009, resulted in a Canadian Human Rights Tribunal ruling Sec. 13, essentially,  unconstitutional.

However, we cannot rest on our laurels.

We usually don't quote or acknowledge the anonymous smear artists at Anti-Racist Canada. After all, who goes around trying to answer graffiti on a washroom wall? ["Call Susie for a good time -- 403 -777-7777" "No, Susie is no fun."]

However, in their sour report on the partial defeat of censorship, ARC, which, we know, has sinister connections in Ottawa observes:

"And it is of note that while it is the current government who passed the legislation, there's nothing that says a future government might not reinstate Section 13 given that it had been deemed constitutional both in 1990 and more recently in the Whatcott case.

 Time will tell and we are very patient. In the meantime, we'll see how things play out."

The Federal Court overturned most of the decision in the Lemire case and upheld the constitutionality -- minus the financial penalties -- of Sec. 13. This ruling is now being appealed to the Federal Court and CAFE is in the thick of the fray as an intervener. Note the threat that a future government -- NDP, Liberal? -- might reintroduce Sec. 13. Don't kid yourself, having read some of the Senate speeches on the repeal of Sec. 13, I can assure you censorship and thought control still have some powerful pals in Ottawa.

Paul Fromm

Director

CANADIAN ASSOCIATION FOR FREE EXPRESSION

To: mailto:h******* 

Subject: Re: Please vote for C-304

 Dear Sir,

I did.

The Bill passed today in the Senate and was given Royal Assent.

Thanks for your concern for free speech.

Yours,

Dennis Patterson
Senator for Nunavut

Here’s to free speech! I deeply regret my old comrade
Doug Christie did not live to see this important victory.
To: mailto:h*******
Subject: Re: Please vote for C-304
 
Dear  Sir,
I did.
The Bill passed today in the Senate and was given  Royal Assent.
Thanks for your concern for free  speech.
Yours,
Dennis Patterson Senator for  Nunavut

Arthur Topham Explains the Origins of Sec. 13 (Now Internet Censorship) of the Canadian Human Rights Act

Arthur Topham Explains the Origins of Sec. 13 (Now Internet Censorship) of the Canadian Human Rights Act
Political dissident and free speech warrior Arthur Topham, relying on research done by lawyer Barbara Kulazska and Marc Lemire provides a tidy summary of the repressive Sec. 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, which Marc Lemire is fighting to have ruled unconstitutional before the Federal Court of Appeal. CAFE has backed Mr. Lemire’s decade-long battle against a complaint by Richard Warman and is intervening on his behalf in the Federal Court fo Appeal.
Paul Fromm
Director
CANADIAN ASSOCIATION FOR FREE EXPRESSION
Here   in Canada, in the mid-1970s, the Jewish lobby began in earnest their   surreptitious efforts to silence Canadians by working through Ontario’s then   Deputy Attorney General, F.W. Callaghan. Callaghan, obviously pressured by   Jewish groups who wanted to silence one of their critics, John Ross Taylor,   began lobbying the Federal Department of Justice demanding the inclusion of   speech-restricting legislation that removed the need for “willfulness” or fair   comment based on public interest. ( See the following site for the full   history of Section 13: http://www.stopsection13.com/history_of_sec13.html )

Photo: Arthur Topham Explains the Origins of Sec. 13 (Now Internet Censorship) of the Canadian Human Rights Act

Political dissident and free speech warrior Arthur Topham, relying on research done by lawyer Barbara Kulazska and Marc Lemire provides a tidy summary of the repressive Sec. 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, which Marc Lemire is fighting to have ruled unconstitutional before the Federal Court of Appeal. CAFE has backed Mr. Lemire's decade-long battle against a complaint by Richard Warman and is intervening on his behalf in the Federal Court fo Appeal.

Paul Fromm

Director

CANADIAN ASSOCIATION FOR FREE EXPRESSION

Here in Canada, in the mid-1970s, the Jewish lobby began in earnest their surreptitious efforts to silence Canadians by working through Ontario’s then Deputy Attorney General, F.W. Callaghan. Callaghan, obviously pressured by Jewish groups who wanted to silence one of their critics, John Ross Taylor, began lobbying the Federal Department of Justice demanding the inclusion of speech-restricting legislation that removed the need for “willfulness” or fair comment based on public interest. ( See the following site for the full history of Section 13: http://www.stopsection13.com/history_of_sec13.html )

According to Marc Lemire’s history of Section 13, “In 1976, the Federal Government was looking at a larger Act for employment issues and the provision of federally regulated services.”  This Act eventually would end up with the innocuous sounding name: the Canadian Human Rights Act. Although no other section of the Human Rights Act covered speech, it was not a problem for the Federal government to capitulate [to the Jewish lobby. Ed.] and slip in an extra section to satisfy Ontario’s Attorney General’s lust to silence John Ross Taylor and his home-based answering machine.”

In 1977 Bill C-25 or the “Canadian Human Rights Act” was passed by the House of Commons on July 14th. Contained within it under the sub-title of “Hate messages” was Section 13 which read:

13. (1) It is a discriminatory practice for a person or a group of persons acting in concert to communicate telephonically or to cause to be so communicated, repeatedly, in whole or in part by means of the facilities of a telecommunication undertaking within the legislative authority of Parliament, any matter that is likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or contempt by reason of the fact that that person or those persons are identifiable on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination.

As Lemire goes on to state:

“Only a few years after the law was enacted, Mr. Callaghan finally got his wish and John Ross Taylor became its first victim, with the Canadian Human Rights Commission itself and several professional Jewish groups [Canadian Holocaust Remembrance Association and the Toronto Zionist Council. Ed.] as the complainants.

Since the law was first enacted, two major changes were made to Section 13.  These changes fundamentally shifted the original intent of the legislation, and turned Section 13 into an instrument to financially and morally punish those with politically incorrect views.

The first change to the legislation occurred on May 15, 1998, when Royal Accent was given to Bill S-5 (1998), which added a new penalty provision to the Canadian Human Rights Act. Bill S-5 added Section 54 to the Canadian Human Rights Act, and allows the Human Rights Tribunal to impose a financial penalty of up to $10,000.  On top of the fines, Section 54 also gave the fanatical Tribunal the ability to impose penalties of up to $20,000 as so-called ‘special compensation.’

According to the background section of Bill S-5, these penalties were added “as a response to the rising incidence of hate crimes around the world. The government believes that stronger measures are needed to deter individuals and organizations from establishing hate lines. It hopes to accomplish this by allowing victims of such lines to apply for compensation and subjecting offenders to financial penalty.”

The second change occurred in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001.  Sadly, this legislation equated non-violent politically incorrect words – which are covered by Section 13 – with terrorism and concerns of national security. Under the guise of Bill C-36 – Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act, Section 13 was expanded to cover “a group of interconnected or related computers, including the Internet.” This change, gave the power to Canadian Human Rights Commission to censor the internet and harass Canadians with views that the Rights Fanatics disagree with. [Emphasis added. Ed.]

This change was made according to Preamble of Bill C-36 to allegedly ‘combat terrorism.’”

According   to Marc Lemire’s history of Section 13, “In 1976, the Federal Government was   looking at a larger Act for employment issues and the provision of federally   regulated services.”  This Act eventually would end up with the innocuous   sounding name: the Canadian Human Rights Act. Although no other   section of the Human Rights Act covered speech, it was not a problem for the   Federal government to capitulate [to the Jewish lobby. Ed.] and slip in   an extra section to satisfy Ontario’s Attorney General’s lust to silence John   Ross Taylor and his home-based answering machine.”

In   1977 Bill C-25 or the “Canadian Human Rights Act” was passed by the House of   Commons on July 14th. Contained within it under the sub-title of “Hate   messages” was Section 13 which read:

13.   (1) It is a discriminatory practice for a person or a group of persons   acting in concert to communicate telephonically or to cause to be so   communicated, repeatedly, in whole or in part by means of the facilities of a   telecommunication undertaking within the legislative authority of Parliament,   any matter that is likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or contempt   by reason of the fact that that person or those persons are identifiable on   the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination.

As   Lemire goes on to state:

“Only   a few years after the law was enacted, Mr. Callaghan finally got his wish and   John Ross Taylor became its first victim, with the Canadian Human Rights   Commission itself and several professional Jewish groups [Canadian   Holocaust Remembrance Association and the Toronto Zionist Council. Ed.] as   the complainants.

Since   the law was first enacted, two major changes were made to Section 13.    These changes fundamentally shifted the original intent of the legislation,   and turned Section 13 into an instrument to financially and morally punish   those with politically incorrect views.

The   first change to the legislation occurred on May 15, 1998, when Royal Accent   was given to Bill S-5 (1998), which added a new penalty provision to   the Canadian Human Rights Act. Bill S-5 added Section 54 to   the Canadian Human Rights Act, and allows the Human Rights   Tribunal to impose a financial penalty of up to $10,000.  On top of the   fines, Section 54 also gave the fanatical Tribunal the ability to impose   penalties of up to $20,000 as so-called ‘special compensation.’

According   to the background section of Bill S-5, these penalties were added “as a   response to the rising incidence of hate   crimes around the world. The government believes that stronger   measures are needed to deter individuals and organizations from   establishing hate lines. It hopes to accomplish this   by allowing victims of such lines to apply for compensation and subjecting   offenders to financial penalty.”

The   second change occurred in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September   11th 2001.  Sadly, this legislation equated non-violent politically   incorrect words – which are covered by Section 13 – with terrorism and   concerns of national security. Under the guise of Bill C-36 –    Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act, Section 13 was expanded to cover    “a group of interconnected or related computers, including the   Internet.” This change, gave the power to Canadian Human Rights   Commission to censor the internet and harass Canadians with views that the   Rights Fanatics disagree with. [Emphasis added. Ed.]

This   change was made according to Preamble of Bill C-36 to allegedly ‘combat   terrorism.’”