Dear Mr. Rilkoff, Ms Quail and others,
I am filing my application to dismiss on the following grounds,
BC Human Rights Code:
27 (1) A member or panel may, at any time after a complaint is filed and with or without a
hearing, dismiss all or part of the complaint if that member or panel determines that any of the
(b) the acts or omissions alleged in the complaint or that part of the complaint do not
contravene this Code;
(c) there is no reasonable prospect that the complaint will succeed;
And the Word of God:
“He who created them from the beginning made them male and female.”
There is a very high threshold which must be established for a finding of ‘hate speech’ under
provincial human rights codes further to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision
in Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott,  1 SCR 467, 2013 SCC 11
(CanLII). The flyers are not even remotely close to meeting that threshold.
According to the Supreme Court in that case:
The definition of “hatred” set out in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, 1990 CanLII
26 (SCC),  3 S.C.R. 892, with some modifications, provides a workable approach to
interpreting the word “hatred” as it is used in legislative provisions prohibiting hate speech.
Three main prescriptions must be followed. First, courts must apply the hate speech prohibitions
objectively. The question courts must ask is whether a reasonable person, aware of the context
and circumstances, would view the expression as exposing the protected group to
hatred. Second, the legislative term “hatred” or “hatred or contempt” must be interpreted as
being restricted to those extreme manifestations of the emotion described by the words
“detestation” and “vilification”. This filters out expression which, while repugnant and
offensive, does not incite the level of abhorrence, delegitimization and rejection that risks
causing discrimination or other harmful effects. Third, tribunals must focus their analysis on the
effect of the expression at issue, namely whether it is likely to expose the targeted person or
group to hatred by others. The repugnancy of the ideas being expressed is not sufficient to
justify restricting the expression, and whether or not the author of the expression intended to
incite hatred or discriminatory treatment is irrelevant. The key is to determine the likely effect of
the expression on its audience, keeping in mind the legislative objectives to reduce or eliminate
discrimination. In light of these three directives, the term “hatred” contained in a legislative hate
speech prohibition should be applied objectively to determine whether a reasonable person,
aware of the context and circumstances, would view the expression as likely to expose a person
or persons to detestation and vilification on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination.
In my submission, simply expressing the opinion that the Complainant is a man does not
possibly rise to the level of hate speech. The fact that the Complainant was a political candidate
and narrowly lost is irrelevant to whether the speech is hate speech under Whatcott SCC 2013.
The Tribunal must first ask, “whether a reasonable person, aware of the context and
circumstances, would view the expression as exposing the protected group to hatred.” The flyers
do not expose the Complainant to hatred. The flyers express the opinion that the Complainant is
a man, and that people should not vote for someone who pretends to be a woman for the
purposes of an election. The purpose of the flyers is to bring transparency to the democratic
process – voters deserve transparency. Saying that someone should not vote for a candidate is not
exposing them to “hatred”. The flyers express a protected religious belief that gender is male and
female, and not subject to change. That is not hate speech. That is an opinion, and we have
freedom to have those under section 2(b) of the Charter in this country.
Second, the Tribunal must restrict its consideration of the whether the flyers were “hateful” to a
definition of hatred that restricts itself to the one the Supreme Court of Canada outlined
in Whatcott: “extreme manifestations of the emotion described by the words “detestation” and
“vilification””. The flyers do not even begin to approach extreme manifestations described by
“detestation” and “vilification”. The flyers don’t advocate violence or persecution – they advocate
not voting for the Complainant. That does not even remotely qualify as “hate”.
Third, the Tribunal must focus on the expression and consider whether it was “likely to
expose the targeted person or group to hatred by others. The repugnancy of the ideas being
expressed is not sufficient to justify restricting the expression, and whether or not the
author of the expression intended to incite hatred or discriminatory treatment is
irrelevant.” The result of the community was predictable: they either told me I was an
idiot, or they ignored me. No one read the flyer and “vilified” the Complainant. No one
acted out against the Complainant. The Complainant has pointed to no harm at all from the
flyers, except to claim that the Complainant lost the election because of them, which is
irrelevant to a consideration of this matter, and no link has been established between the
election result and the flyers, in any event.
I could not be successfully sued for defamation for the content of the flyers: the
Complainant fathered two children with a biological woman that the Complainant was
once married or in a common law relationship with. It is not hateful to highlight biological
reality. The Complainant identifies as a woman, but the Complainant differs
physiologically from a biological woman. It is not hate speech to point this out.
Lastly, many millions of people in Canada believe and express the biological reality of sex
as being male or female. The statements in the flyers are not unusual. They represent a
common understanding of biology that is both accepted in science and taught in religion.
In Whatcott, the Court delineated the line between protected expression under the Charter
and hate speech:
“In my view, expression that “ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of” does
not rise to the level of ardent and extreme feelings that were found essential to the
constitutionality of s. 13(1) of the CHRA in Taylor. Those words are not synonymous with
“hatred” or “contempt”. Rather, they refer to expression which is derogatory and
insensitive, such as representations criticizing or making fun of protected groups on the
basis of their commonly shared characteristics and practices, or on stereotypes. As
Richards J.A. observed in Owens, at para. 53:
Much speech which is self-evidently constitutionally protected involves some measure of
ridicule, belittlement or an affront to dignity grounded in characteristics like race, religion
and so forth. I have in mind, by way of general illustration, the editorial cartoon which
satirizes people from a particular country, the magazine piece which criticizes the social
policy agenda of a religious group and so forth. Freedom of speech in a healthy and robust
democracy must make space for that kind of discourse . . . .
I agree. Expression criticizing or creating humour at the expense of others can be
derogatory to the extent of being repugnant. Representations belittling a minority group or
attacking its dignity through jokes, ridicule or insults may be hurtful and offensive.
However, for the reasons discussed above, offensive ideas are not sufficient to ground a
justification for infringing on freedom of expression. While such expression may inspire
feelings of disdain or superiority, it does not expose the targeted group to hatred.”
The complaint should be dismissed because there is no reasonable chance it will succeed in
light of the law in regard to hate speech from the Supreme Court of Canada.
Under section 27(1)(b), the Complaint should be dismissed because the flyers are not a
contravention of the Human Rights Code.
Finally, the flyers are clearly in harmony with Matthew 19 in the Holy Bible, and I would
like to remind the Chairperson and everyone else reading this; God is the highest arbiter of
right and wrong and one day we will all stand before Him.
In Christ’s Service,