New York Dems Seek to Block Chick-fil-A From State’s Rest Stops – Newsmax
Dr. Seuss? Canceled.
Old Glory? Canceled.
4th of July? Canceled.
And now…Cancel Culture’s latest victim? CHICK-FIL-A! That’s right. New York Democrats are trying to CANCEL Chick-Fil-A and BLOCK America’s beloved chicken sandwich from New York’s rest stops — all because the fast-food company is run by conservatives.
Important Legal Documents & Mail Being Kept from Political Prisoner Dr. James Sears
The Canadian Association for Free Expression learned today that information is being kept from political prisoner Dr. James Sears. A judge’s July 16 refusal to grant leave to appeal had not been given to him 13 days later.
He has received NONE of the many cards & letters sent to him. Did the censors get them or did the COVID eat them?
Dr. Sears was jailed for a year for satirical writing about privileged minorities, Jews and women, in the tabloid YOUR WARD NEWS, which he edited from 2016-2019. He was convicted under Canada’s notorious censorship law, Sec. 319 of the Criminal Code — the “hate law”.
He is being held in the Toronto South Detention Centre in Etobicoke.
FREE POLITICAL PRISONER, DR. JAMES SEARS
PLEASE SEND POSTCARDS OR LETTERS OF SUPPORT TO ONE OF OUR MEN BEHIND THE WIRE.
Dr. James Sears, Political Prisoner, Toronto South Detention Center, 160 Horner Ave, Toronto, ON M8Z 0C2 CANADA
Disappointing — Political Prisoner Dr. James Sears Will Remain in Jail for Writing Politically Incorrect Satire in YOUR WARD NEWS: Court of Appeal for Ontario Won’t Grant Him Leave to Appeal
It took Motions Judge David Brown a full month to peruse Dr. James Sears’ Application for Leave to Appeal his conviction and maximum sentence of one year’s imprisonment under Canada’s notorious “hate law”, Sec. 319 of the Criminal Code for satirical writings about privileged minorities (Jews and women) in the tabloid YOUR WARD NEWS. Judge Brown in his July 16 ruling denied leave (permission) for the Court to hear Dr. Sears’ appeal.
So, a Canadian writer and newspaperman will remain in jail as a political prisoner, a non-violent prisoner of conscience in a Cultural Marxist ruled country that praises “diversity” but detests “diversity” of opinion.
Dr. Sears is being held in the South Toronto Detention Centre and is considering his legal options.
What follows is the text of Judge Brown’s ruling.
Paul Fromm
Director
Canadian Association for Free Expression
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
CITATION: R. v. Sears, 2021 ONCA 522
DATE: 20210716
DOCKET: M52559 & M52561
Brown J.A. (Motions Judge)
BETWEEN
Her Majesty the Queen
Responding Party
and
James Sears
Applicant
James Sears, acting in person
Ian McCuaig, assisting the applicant
Michael Bernstein, for the responding party
Heard: June 18, 2021 by video conference
ENDORSEMENT
I. OVERVIEW
[1] The applicant, James Sears, applies for leave to appeal from the order of the Summary Conviction Appeal Judge, Cavanagh J. (the “Appeal Judge”), and, if leave is granted, bail pending appeal.
[2] On January 24, 2019, the applicant and his co-accused, LeRoy (Lawrence) St. Germaine, were found guilty on two counts of willfully promoting hatred against identifiable groups – Jews and women – contrary to s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code. Neither accused testified at trial. The trial judge sentenced the applicant to a term of imprisonment of six months on each count, to be served consecutively.
[3] The convictions stemmed from statements written and published by the applicant and his co-accused in 22 issues of a newspaper called “Your Ward News” distributed in Toronto and online between January 2015 and June 2018.
[4] The applicant appealed his conviction and sentence to the Superior Court of Justice. The Appeal Judge dismissed the appeal: R. v. Sears, 2021 ONSC 4272 (“Appeal Reasons”).
[5] The applicant then applied before this court for leave to appeal his conviction and sentence pursuant to Criminal Code s. 839(1). As well, the applicant sought bail pending his appeal.
[6] The applications came before me on Monday, June 14, 2021. I advised the applicant that his application for bail pending appeal would necessarily entail a consideration of the merits of his leave to appeal application. Although I had jurisdiction to hear his application for leave to appeal[1], the practice of this court is for a panel to consider such applications in writing: Criminal Code, s. 839(1); “Practice Direction Concerning Criminal Appeals at the Court of Appeal for Ontario”, (March 1, 2017), at 7.3.6. The applicant advised that he wished to proceed before a single judge. I adjourned the hearing until Friday, June 18, 2021 to permit the applicant to file further materials.
II. GOVERNING PRINCIPLES
[7] An appeal to the Court of Appeal in summary conviction matters lies, with leave, “on any ground that involves a question of law alone”: Criminal Code, s. 839(1). The principles governing such applications for leave were summarized by this court in R. v. Lam, 2016 ONCA 850, at paras. 9 and 10, leave to appeal refused, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 2:
Section 839(1) of the Criminal Code limits appeals to this court from decisions of summary conviction appeal courts to grounds involving questions of law alone and requires that leave to appeal be granted by this court. This second level of appeal in summary conviction proceedings is an appeal from the decision of the summary conviction appeal court, not a second appeal from the decision of the trial court. The appeal is limited to questions of law alone and does not extend to questions of fact alone or of mixed fact and law, as do appeals to the summary conviction appeal court from decisions made at trial. Second appeals in summary conviction proceedings are the exception, not the rule: R. v. R.(R), 2008 ONCA 497, 90 O.R. (3d) 641, at para. 25.
Two key variables influence the leave decision:
• The significance of the legal issue(s) raised to the general administration of criminal justice
• The merits of the proposed ground(s) of appeal.
Issues that have significance to the administration of criminal justice beyond the particular case may warrant leave to appeal, provided the grounds are at least arguable, even if not especially strong. And leave to appeal may also be granted even if the issues lack general importance, provided the merits appear very strong, especially if the conviction is serious and an applicant is facing a significant deprivation of his or her liberty: R.(R.), at para. 37.
[8] To those principles I would add two others. First, since an appeal pursuant to s. 839(1) is an appeal against the judgment of the summary conviction appeal court, not a second appeal of the trial judgment, the leave to appeal judge should determine whether the summary conviction appeal judge properly applied the principles governing appellate review of the trial decision: John Sopinka, Mark Gelowitz & W. David Rankin, Sopinka and Gelowitz on the Conduct of an Appeal, 4th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2018), at §3.119; R. v. McCammon, 2013 MBCA 68, 294 Man. R. (2d) 194, at paras. 21, 36; R. v. C.S.M., 2004 NSCA 60, 223 N.S.R. (2d) 311, at para. 26.
[9] Second, the leave to appeal test should be relaxed where the summary conviction appeal decision is, in effect, a decision of first instance, for example where the appeal court reverses a decision of the trial court by substituting an acquittal for a conviction: R. v. O’Meara, 2012 ONCA 420, 292 O.A.C. 358, at para. 25. That a new issue arose for the first time on the summary conviction appeal is an important contextual factor within which to address the R. v. R.R., 2008 ONCA 497, 90 O.R. (3d) 641, test: R. v. MacKay, 2012 ONCA 671, 112 O.R. (3d) 561, at paras. 21-22.
III. THE APPLICANT’S GROUNDS OF APPEAL
[10] The applicant acts in person. As a former medical doctor, the applicant is very articulate. However, his written materials at times lack focus or sufficient legal particularity.
[11] The applicant’s Notice of Appeal identifies six grounds of appeal, which really amount to five as the fourth and sixth grounds essentially relate to the same sentencing issue concerning the imposition of consecutive sentences. The applicant’s Notice of Application for Release Pending Appeal and Leave to Appeal repeats three of the grounds contained in the Notice of Appeal.
[12] At the hearing on June 14, the applicant was assisted by Mr. Ian McCuaig, who was counsel at trial and on appeal for the applicant’s co-accused. In response to my inquiry for a more focused statement of the questions of law alone on which the applicant seeks leave, Mr. McCuaig sent the court an email identifying three issues that the applicant considers his strongest grounds of appeal. They are:
i. A new issue arising from the conduct of the summary conviction appeal: specifically, that the mode of hearing for the appeal was changed from in-person to Zoom videoconference over the applicant’s objections, resulting in an unfair process for the appeal hearing;
ii. The Appeal Judge erred in treating the direct evidence of the actus reus – the 22 editions of Your Ward News – as direct evidence for proving the mens rea of the offences. In the applicant’s view, the newspapers were only circumstantial evidence of mens rea and the trial judge did not satisfy the requirements of R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 1000, when he inferred the applicant’s intent from the contents of the newspapers he edited and wrote; and
[13] On these applications, I will examine those three grounds of appeal, as well as whether the Appeal Judge erred by letting the applicant’s consecutive sentences stand. Although the applicant raised a number of other complaints with the trial decision during oral argument, these four grounds of appeal were the only ones advanced with particularity in the Notice of Appeal and Notice of Application for Release Pending Appeal and Leave to Appeal.
IV. FIRST GROUND: HEARING THE SUMMARY CONVICTION APPEAL BY VIDEOCONFERENCE
The events
[14] The appeal hearing was scheduled to be heard in mid-October 2020. One issue on the appeal concerned the applicant’s allegation of ineffective assistance by trial counsel; the trial judge had dismissed an application for a mistrial by reason of ineffective assistance. Cross-examination on the affidavits relating to that issue would take place at the appeal hearing. The applicant anticipated that the hearing would be in-person as that was the default mode of hearing for self-represented persons at that point of time in the Toronto Region.
[15] A case management conference was held before Akhtar J. on October 9, 2020, who advised that because of increasing COVID-19 infection rates in Toronto the appeal would be heard by Zoom videoconference. The applicant objected, arguing that he was entitled “to see the eyes of the person that is judging me.” A discussion ensued about whether the applicant had to comply with the general rule to wear a mask when entering the courthouse and the ability of supporters of the applicant to watch the appeal. At the end of the discussion Akhtar J. ruled:
[L]isten, I apologize for the miscommunication. There’s clearly been miscommunication [indiscernible] with the court what, what happened. The means of infection is a game changer. They are surging. But I understand that there’d be over a hundred people, potentially, coming into the court and they would not be allowed in the courtroom. And who knows what they’re going to be doing, whether they’re going to be wearing masks or not, I don’t know. Mr. Sears says he won’t wear a mask because he’s exempt. He won’t be allowed into the courthouse, I can assure you of that, because that’s the rule. Mr. Sears, I’ve done my best to accommodate you, and you know that, in every single day here, to try and get this on, on the rails and keep it on the rails. But, you have no entitlement to an in-person hearing. You don’t decide the procedure here. The court does. And based on all the circumstances I’ve heard, including the fact that, as I say, there’s going to be a large crowd coming, there’s going – you’re not going to be wearing a mask, and the fact that these figures today on the COVID I’m hearing, they are going to the Zooms and it is to be a Zoom hearing, and it will be a Zoom hearing.
[16] A Zoom hearing of the appeal commenced before the Appeal Judge on October 13, 2020. The applicant again raised his objection to the appeal proceeding by way of Zoom. He also submitted, by way of a “key takeaway”, that he required additional time to prepare properly for a Zoom hearing: he had planned to use large display boards at the in-person hearing but now would have to prepare a PowerPoint slide presentation. The Appeal Judge granted the applicant’s request for a short adjournment until November 10, 2020.
[17] On November 5, a few days before the scheduled start of the hearing, the Appeal Judge heard a motion by the applicant to adjourn the appeal until it could be conducted in-person. The applicant argued that the order to proceed by Zoom conflicted with information on the court’s website stating that self-represented persons must appear in person and violated his rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
[18] The Appeal Judge dismissed the motion, ruling in part:
This was raised again before me on October 13, 2020 when the applicant appeared by audio conference only, and I granted the requested adjournment on that occasion on the basis that it would not be fair for Mr. Sears to participate in the appeal by audio conference only. And at that time Mr. Sears agreed to secure an Internet link in order to proceed by Zoom, and new dates were scheduled.
Section 715.23 of the Criminal Code provides that the court may order an accused to appear by audio conference or video conference if the court is of the opinion that it would be appropriate, having regard to all the circumstances including the five specified circumstances set out in section 715.23.
In this case the order of Justice Akhtar as the case management judge is an interlocutory order and I lack jurisdiction to hear an appeal from that order.
…
And so in my view the order of Justice Akhtar order is – [indiscernible] the order as stands and I am not allowed to interfere with it on this application. If it turns out that there was a problem with a reasonable apprehension of bias, as Mr. Sears suggests, or any other issue with respect to that interlocutory order, that is properly a matter to be addressed through appeal proceedings, if the summary conviction appeal is dismissed.
[19] Although the applicant informed the Appeal Judge that he might not appear on the first two days of the appeal hearing when the evidence on the ineffective assistance of counsel issue was scheduled, in fact he participated throughout the Zoom appeal hearing.
Positions of the parties
[20] In his Notice of Application for Release Pending Appeal and Leave to Appeal and his Notice of Appeal, the applicant states that the decision of Akhtar J. to change the mode of hearing without notice was procedurally unfair because it contravened “the stated policy of the Court that self-represented appeals would be heard in person.” The decision prejudiced the applicant “as the appeal included cross examination as part of an ineffective assistance claim, the appeal record was voluminous and the number of issues argued was significant.”
[21] The applicant submits that Akhtar J. lost jurisdiction by overruling the “stated policy of the Court”, which was the September 28, 2020 iteration of the Superior Court of Justice, Toronto Region, “Notice to Profession: Toronto Expansion Protocol for Court Hearings During COVID-19 Pandemic.” Section A.4 dealt with “matters that will continue to be heard remotely.” Subsection (viii) concerned Summary Conviction Appeals. In the section dealing with hearings, para. 4 stated:
All out of custody appellants required to attend the hearings in person are no longer required to do so, unless self-represented. Hearings for self-represented appellants/applicants shall be conducted in person, unless in custody, in which case they will be conducted remotely.
[22] In his Enhanced Book of Authorities and Unfiltered Oral Argument Notes for Summary Conviction Appeal (“Unfiltered Argument”), which the applicant filed at the appeal hearing and on these applications, he describes his objection to a Zoom appeal hearing in the following terms:
I am being denied my constitutional right to an in-person hearing, and instead, under threat of imprisonment, I have been ordered to stare into a video screen at a cluster of pixels being transmitted from the Ministry of Truth. I am told that the image formed on the screen represents the Arbitrator of Truth who I must refer to as “His Honour” and who may be a real human or an A.I. virtual image.
…
And the reason I am forbidden to meet my arbitrator in person is that the Ministry of Truth is an arm of a fascist government which conveniently claims that an invisible virus could strike dead the Ministry of Truth’s aged prosecutor. And my suggestion that he alone appear by ZOOM is rejected without a reason.
[23] The Crown submits that this ground of appeal does not involve a question of law alone. Sections 683(2.1) and 822(1) of the Criminal Code provide a summary conviction appeal judge with the statutory power to order an appeal hearing to proceed by videoconference. Akhtar J.’s exercise of that statutory power does not give rise to a question of law alone. In any event, the applicant’s particular complaints about the mode of hearing do not have significance to the administration of justice beyond the four corners of the case.
Analysis
[24] I do not understand the applicant to be taking the position that Akhtar J. lacked the power to direct a videoconference appeal hearing. That is understandable given that s. 683(2.1) of the Criminal Code, which applies to summary conviction appeals by reason of s. 822(1), states: “In proceedings under this section, the court of appeal may order that a party appear by audioconference or videoconference, if the technological means is satisfactory to the court.”[2]
[25] Instead, I understand the applicant to be arguing that Akhtar J. improperly exercised his power to order a videoconference hearing because the Notice to Profession then in force contemplated in-person hearings for summary conviction appeals where the appellant was self-represented.
[26] I am not persuaded that a challenge to a procedural decision made within the jurisdiction of a summary conviction appeal judge raises “a question of law alone” within the meaning of s. 839(1) of the Criminal Code: R. v. Bresnark, 2013 ONCA 110, at para. 7.
[27] Even if the ruling could be characterized as a breach of procedural fairness giving rise to a question of law alone, the merits of this ground are very weak for two reasons. First, as disclosed in his reasons, Akhtar J. exercised his discretion to direct a Zoom hearing at a time of increasing public health concerns with the start of the COVID-19 “second wave” in Ontario, which resulted in the cancellation of most in-person attendances. Second, the prejudice the applicant sought to avoid – namely, impediments to adducing viva voce evidence and cross-examining on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel – evidently did not materialize for he has not sought leave to appeal the Appeal Judge’s dismissal of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
[28] Nor does this ground of appeal involve a matter of significance to the general administration of criminal justice: it concerns the exercise of judicial discretion on a specific set of facts at a point of time when there were unique public health concerns.
[29] Accordingly, treating this ground of appeal as a new issue arising from the appeal hearing, I do not see it satisfying even a relaxed application of the R.R. principles regarding s. 839(1) leaves to appeal.
V. SECOND GROUND: CHALLENGING THE FINDINGS ON THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENCES
[30] The 22 issues of Your Ward News were marked as Exhibit 2 at trial. The trial judge wrote:
After considering the entirety of Exhibit 2, a consistent and obvious theme that radiated from this publication was hatred. It was at times contradictory in that love was professed to Jews and some women. It was at times satirical in that humour and exaggeration were employed to make the point. But hatred of Jews and women was overwhelmingly the message.
[31] The trial judge went on to find that: (i) “both men intended to publish hate. No other intent can be inferred from a complete reading of this newspaper”; (ii) “there exists significant evidence of the promotion of that hatred which undeniably illustrates their intent to pass on to others the message of hate towards Jews and women”; and (iii) “both men were fully aware of the unrelenting promotion of hate in YWN and intended that hatred to be delivered to others.”
[32] The applicant appealed those findings, advancing his objections under several discrete grounds of appeal, contending that the trial judge: provided insufficient reasons; failed to read the publications as a whole and failed to consider the published words in their context; wrongly treated the 22 issues of Your Ward News as direct evidence from which he could infer intent; failed to consider alternate, non-criminal meanings for the published words; and misapprehended the evidence thereby rendering the verdict unreasonable. The Appeal Judge rejected the applicant’s objections.
[33] On these applications, the applicant repeats his challenge to the trial judge’s findings, organizing his complaints under two grounds of appeal contained in his Notice of Appeal and Notice of Application for Release Pending Appeal and Leave to Appeal: (i) the Appeal Judge improperly applied the test for promotion of hatred and erred in concluding that statements made by the applicant constituted promotion of hatred; and (ii) the Appeal Judge improperly applied the law relating to circumstantial evidence with respect to the issue of wilfulness.
[34] In comprehensive reasons, the Appeal Judge dealt with each submission. His reasons disclose that he:
i. correctly identified the applicable scope of appellate review: Appeal Reasons, at paras. 15-19; 23; 39-42; 49-50; 55; 57; 61; and 67;
ii. correctly identified the governing legal principles set out in R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, and found that the trial judge had given himself the direction recommended in that case: Appeal Reasons, at paras. 31-33;
iii. accurately summarized the facts and principles in Villaroman, seeing no error in the trial judge’s finding that the contents of the 22 issues of Your Ward News constituted direct evidence of the statements made by the applicant from which the intention of the applicant could be inferred: Appeal Reasons, at paras. 34-37;
iv. on the latter point, properly referred to and applied the observation in Keegstra, at p. 778, that “[t]o determine if the promotion of hatred was intended, the trier will usually make an inference as to the necessary mens rea based upon the statements made”: Appeal Reasons, at para. 65;
v. Accurately read the trial judge’s reasons as stating that he had read the entirety of all 22 issues of Your Ward News, had assessed the statements made in context, and understood the distinction between hate speech and merely offensive or distasteful statements: Appeal Reasons, at paras. 33, 46, 58-61; and
vi. As part of the process of appellate review, reviewed the evidence of the issues of Your Ward News marked as Exhibit 2 at trial: Appeal Reasons, at paras. 56-61.
[35] That process of appellate review led the Appeal Judge to conclude, at paras. 58 and 61:
In his reasons, the trial judge found that “[w]hen all 22 issues are examined, one is left with unfocused and absurd opinions, contradictory messages, and scattershot ramblings. Except for its stated claims of being the world’s largest anti-Marxist publication, YWN exhibits no unifying concept.” This finding is reasonably supported by the evidence.
…
Based on my review of the published issues of YWN marked at trial as Exhibit 2, I am satisfied that there was ample evidence upon which the trial judge could reasonably make these findings and reach these conclusions. Statements described by the trial judge in paragraphs 11 and 12 of his reasons as communicating hatred, within the meaning of that term in Keegstra, against women and Jews are found in the issues of YWN received in evidence. The trial judge’s reasons show why he decided as he did, and they show a logical connection between why he decided as he did and the evidence that was the basis for his decision. The 22 issues of YWN received in evidence provide the basis for public accountability of the trial judge’s reasons. The trial judge’s reasons, read in the context of the evidence at trial and the submissions made by counsel, do not foreclose appellate review.
[36] The applicant has not identified any error of law that tainted the Appeal Judge’s analysis. As I understand his submissions, the applicant simply repeats his disagreements with how the trial judge applied the law to the specific facts of his case and complains that the Appeal Judge did not apply the law to the facts in a different way. This ground of appeal is fact-focused and does not engage a question of law alone.
VI. THIRD GROUND: APPLICATION OF S. 718.2(a)(i) TO OFFENCES UNDER S. 319(2)
[37] In his reasons for sentence, the trial judge identified, as an aggravating factor, that Criminal Code s. 718.2(a)(i) provides that “where offences are motivated by hate, the sentences ought to be increased.” That section deems to be an aggravating circumstance “evidence that the offence was motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation, or gender identity or expression, or on any other similar factor.”
[38] In his factum on appeal, the applicant enumerated 10 errors committed by the trial judge in his sentence, including “misapplying Section 718.2(a)(i), as Parliament never meant it to redundify Section 319.” In his “Unfiltered Argument”, the applicant contended that since some speakers during the Parliamentary debate over the enactment of s. 718.2 gave examples of hate motivated crimes causing physical harm to people and the then Minister of Justice, Allan Rock, stated the proposed amendment had “nothing to do with policing or punishing the way people think or the views they hold”, it follows that s. 718.2(a)(i) applies only to violent crime against an individual. Since the applicant did not commit such a crime, he contends that the trial judge erred by relying on s. 718.2(a)(i) as part of his determination of sentence.
[39] In oral submissions, the applicant complained that the Appeal Judge failed to deal with his ground of appeal involving s. 718.2(a)(i). He contends that s. 718.2(a)(i) applies only to cases other than hate speech under Criminal Code s. 319.
[40] No doubt the proper interpretation of a provision of the Criminal Code involves a question of law. So, too, the proper interpretation of a provision of the Criminal Code is an issue of significance to the administration of criminal justice beyond the particular case. Yet, the applicant offers no arguable grounds for his position outlined above. On its face, s. 718.2(a)(i) applies to all offences in the Criminal Code; it identifies no exception. The applicant advances no plausible argument based on the principles of statutory interpretation that would create an exception where none exists.
[41] However, I have considered the applicant’s submission from a different angle. Perhaps the applicant is attempting to argue that by taking into account the statutory aggravating factors in s. 718.2(a)(i) the trial judge, in effect, impermissibly considered elements of the offence under s. 319(2) as aggravating factors. Characterizing an element of the offence as an aggravating factor is a reviewable error: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at para. 42; R. v. Adan, 2019 ONCA 709, at para. 106. Nevertheless, numerous cases have found no such error where a sentencing judge has taken into account statutory aggravating factors that are themselves elements of the offence: R. v. Tejeda-Rosario, 2010 ONCA 367, 262 O.A.C. 228, at paras. 12-13; R. v. B.S., 2019 ONCA 72, at para. 12; R. v. S.C.W., 2019 BCCA 405, at paras. 27-36; R. v. JAS., 2019 ABCA 376, at paras. 18-19. In any event, even where a sentencing judge errs, appellate intervention requires demonstrating that the error had an impact on the sentence. In the present case, the Appeal Judge considered whether the trial judge had erred by imposing a demonstrably unfit sentence. He concluded, at para. 136, that the applicant had not shown that the trial judge imposed a demonstrably unfit sentence. The applicant has not identified any arguable error of law in the Appeal Judge’s review of this aspect of the sentence.
[42] Consequently, this ground of appeal does not satisfy the principles in R.R.
VII. FOURTH GROUND: IMPOSITION OF CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES
[43] The trial judge sentenced the applicant to the maximum sentence of six months on each of the two counts, to be served consecutively. In determining that the sentences should be consecutive, the trial judge applied the decision of this court in R. v. Gummer (1983), 1 O.A.C. 141, [1983] O.J. No. 181 (C.A).
[44] Gummer involved convictions for dangerous driving and failing to stop. In setting aside the imposition of concurrent sentences and making them consecutive, this court stated at para. 13:
We do not consider the rule that sentences for offences arising out of the same transaction or incident should normally be concurrent necessarily applies where the offences constitute invasions of different legally-protected interests, although the principle of totality must be kept in mind. The offences of dangerous driving and “failing to remain” protect different social interests. The offence of dangerous driving is to protect the public from driving of the proscribed kind. The offence of failing to remain under s. 233(2) of the Code imposes a duty on the person having the care of a motor vehicle which has been involved in an accident, whether or not fault is attributable to him in respect of the accident, to remain and discharge the duties imposed upon him in such circumstances.
[45] The trial judge stated, at para. 12:
In this case, identifiable groups, those being women and Jews, have separate, legally-protected interests. The defendant could promote hatred against one and not the other, or vice versa. He promoted hatred against both. In addition, the hate was promoted against both groups not from one incident, but many, and consistently over a period of three years.
[46] On his appeal from sentence, the applicant submitted that the trial judge committed an error in principle by deciding that the sentence for each count should be served consecutively rather than concurrently. The Appeal Judge did not accept that submission. The Appeal Judge properly recited the deference owed to a sentencing decision absent an error in principle or demonstrably unfit sentence. In the case before him, the Appeal Judge concluded that the trial judge did not err in principle by ordering that the sentence on each count be served consecutively, stating at paras. 129-130:
Counsel for Mr. St. Germaine submits that the only relevant interest for a sentencing judge to consider is society’s interest, and that the trial judge erred by identifying two separate interests. I disagree with this submission. Society has an interest in discouraging hate crimes against different groups and, just as in Gummer, the trial judge concluded in respect of the charges against the appellants, that there were two separate societal interests, discouraging hatred against women and discouraging hatred against Jews.
The Crown proceeded with a two-count information against each appellant and it acted within its discretion to do so. The trial judge had reviewed the collection of the 22 issues of YWN that were introduced into evidence, and he was well situated to decide whether the communications against women and against Jews in those issues should properly be treated as part of the same conduct against two groups who do not not enjoy separate protected interests, such that concurrent sentences would be proper. The trial judge, having reviewed the 22 issues, concluded that the communications promoting hatred were directed against separate identifiable groups, women and Jews, and each has a separate legally protected interest.
[47] On this application, the applicant submits that the Appeal Judge erred in law in allowing the order for consecutive sentences to stand.
[48] I am not persuaded that this ground of appeal amounts to a “question of law alone”. The Appeal Judge properly identified the principles governing his appellate review of the trial judge’s sentence. The applicant does not identify any conflict within the jurisprudence relevant to the circumstances of his sentence. Finally, as pointed out in Clayton C. Ruby, Sentencing, 10th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2020), at §14.18, “it becomes a fact-specific inquiry of whether the nexus between offences is sufficiently or insufficiently close to merit either consecutive or concurrent sentences.” [Emphasis added.]
VIII. DISPOSITION
[49] For the reasons set out above, I am not satisfied that the applicant’s proposed appeal meets the requirements of Criminal Code s. 839(1), as interpreted by R.R. Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal is dismissed. It follows that the application for bail pending appeal is also dismissed.
“David Brown J.A.”
[1] Section 839(1) of the Criminal Code states, in part: “Subject to subsection (1.1), an appeal to the court of appeal as defined in section 673 may, with leave of that court or a judge thereof, be taken on any ground that involves a question of law alone …” [Emphasis added.]
Australia’s Medico-Stalinist Police State Intensifies — Troops Called Out to Enforce Lockdown in Sydney
Sydney police call for military to enforce lockdown
Issued on: 29/07/2021 – 09:36Modified: 29/07/2021 – 09:34
Police in Sydney want more powers to enforce a coronavirus lockdown Farooq KHAN AFP
1 min Advertising
Sydney (AFP)
Police in Australia’s largest city have requested military help to enforce a coronavirus lockdown as infections in Sydney reached a new record Thursday.
Commissioner Mick Fuller said New South Wales police had asked for 300 Australian Defence Force personnel to be deployed “to boost its operational footprint”.
The city of five million people is in its fifth week of a lockdown that is set to run until the end of August.
Stay-at-home orders have failed to reduce new infections to zero, and compliance has been patchy.
Sydney residents are only allowed to leave their homes for exercise, essential work, medical reasons, and to shop for necessities such as food.
But for weeks, parks and beach promenades have been filled with Sydneysiders drinking coffee and chatting with friends.
Police have increasingly been doling out fines to those violating the restrictions and Fuller said those efforts would be stepped up in the coming days.
Last weekend thousands of people gathered in central Sydney to protest against the measures, and further demonstrations have been mooted.
Police have also requested more powers to shut down businesses that they say are not abiding by rules on social distancing.
On Thursday state premier Gladys Berejiklian warned that the outbreak — which began mid-June when a driver for an international flight crew contracted the virus — is “likely to get worse”.
Officials announced 239 new infections in Sydney, a record for this outbreak, which now totals 2,810 cases.
With under 14 percent of the Australian population vaccinated, many experts have warned that Sydney’s lockdown could run for months more.
Supplies of Pfizer-BioNTech shots are low and there has been widespread scepticism about the AstraZeneca jab, slowing the vaccine rollout.
PAUL FROMM ON BLOOD RIVER RADIO, SATURDAY JULY 31 — 5:00-7:00 p.m. E.S.T.
Tune in this Saturday, July 31, to BLOOD RIVER RADIO at bloodriverradio.com, 5:00-7:00 p.m. E.S.T. Special Guest Paul Fromm. Charlottesville Changed Everything: Charlottesville’s Importance in White Nationalist History.
U.S.— Experts are warning of yet another new problem facing the nation: They’ve spotted a new, more dangerous freedom variant spreading among the populace. This freedom is so virulent that people infected by it feel they can ignore government edicts about masks and lockdowns.
“Usually, the freedom we see in the wild is fairly mild,” explained CDC official Hubert Pratt. “It’s just freedom to passionately express one of the approved viewpoints on social media or freedom to pick one of the three Obamacare options. But now we see people acting like politicians aren’t in charge of them at all, and it’s dangerous.”
With the new freedom variant, there’s been an outbreak of people not wearing masks, teaching their children their own values, and expressing ideas the Biden Administration would rather they not. Moreover, this freedom is highly contagious, even sometimes breaking into blue states once thought to be immune.
Experts recommend only staying on highly moderated social media sites and watching approved network news to avoid being infected. They also tell people to watch out for the signs of this dangerous freedom variant in others: masklessness, smiling, and prominent displays of the American flag.
July 31, 2021 from 12:00 – 2:00 pm C.L.E.A.R. Kelowna Rally in Stuart Park, Kelowna B.C.
C.L.E.A.R. is honoured to support the Canadian Frontline Nurses. Kristen, Kristal and Sarah will be sharing on unethical practices with respect to the COVID-19 false pandemic. Join us as the Canadian Frontline Nurses discuss their plans for a health revolution moving away from the present day corrupt, regulatory bodies, and into independent practice. Let’s bring nursing back to how it was always supposed to be!
CLEARbc.org C.L.E.A.R.billboard is alerting people to our rallies and encouraging CLEARbc.org website traffic. There were many new faces seen at the last rally. You can view the billboard on the left hand side when you are heading into West Kelowna. It is just before “Friends Pub”.
A Bad Odor After Ontario Special Investigations Unit Clears Two Unnamed Cops Who Shot a 73-Year Old Man Who Had Objected to Supermarket Mask Policy
Ontario SIU cleared two unnamed cops who blew away a 73-year old man who has protested forced masking in a Minden supermarket. Cops claim he fired two shots at them near his home. They smoked him with 26 rounds. Dissent against mask tyranny can be deadly.
The S.I.U. report follows. It raises a number of questions:
Seventy-three year old Leslie Hegedus objected to being forced to wear a mask at Minden, Ontario supermarket. An altercation ensued with two employees. He hit one with his fists but was forced out of the store by a woman employee. He doesn’t sound too dangerous.
2. Outside the store, his car rammed some shopping carts. He drive away to his home.
3. Police were called and pursued him. Neighbours said he’d been shooting off his guns the night before and many empty cartridges were subsequently found. However , he fired only two shots during the incident. The police claim the shots were fired at them, but neither unnamed officer — this secrecy is so characteristic of a police state — was hit.
4. Police did not try negotiation f teargas. They opened with a barrage of fire — 26 rounds, striking Mr. Hegedus twice in the BACK! He was pronounced dead in hospital.
5. No problem. The S.I.U. found the shooting justified. Dissent can be dangerous.
The Special Investigations Unit is a civilian law enforcement agency that investigates incidents involving police officers where there has been death, serious injury or allegations of sexual assault. The Unit’s jurisdiction covers more than 50 municipal, regional and provincial police services across Ontario.
Under the Police Services Act, the Director of the SIU must determine based on the evidence gathered in an investigation whether an officer has committed a criminal offence in connection with the incident under investigation. If, after an investigation, there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offence was committed, the Director has the authority to lay a criminal charge against the officer. Alternatively, in all cases where no reasonable grounds exist, the Director does not lay criminal charges but files a report with the Attorney General communicating the results of an investigation.
Information Restrictions
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (“FIPPA”)
Pursuant to section 14 of FIPPA (i.e., law enforcement), certain information may not be included in this report. This information may include, but is not limited to, the following:
Confidential investigative techniques and procedures used by law enforcement agencies; and
Information whose release could reasonably be expected to interfere with a law enforcement matter or an investigation undertaken with a view to a law enforcement proceeding.
Pursuant to section 21 of FIPPA (i.e., personal privacy), protected personal information is not included in this document. This information may include, but is not limited to, the following:
Subject Officer name(s);
Witness Officer name(s);
Civilian Witness name(s);
Location information;
Witness statements and evidence gathered in the course of the investigation provided to the SIU in confidence; and
Other identifiers which are likely to reveal personal information about individuals involved in the investigation.
Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004 (“PHIPA”)
Pursuant to PHIPA, any information related to the personal health of identifiable individuals is not included.
Other proceedings, processes, and investigations
Information may have also been excluded from this report because its release could undermine the integrity of other proceedings involving the same incident, such as criminal proceedings, coroner’s inquests, other public proceedings and/or other law enforcement investigations.
Mandate Engaged
The Unit’s investigative jurisdiction is limited to those incidents where there is a serious injury (including sexual assault allegations) or death in cases involving the police.
“Serious injuries” shall include those that are likely to interfere with the health or comfort of the victim and are more than merely transient or trifling in nature and will include serious injury resulting from sexual assault. “Serious Injury” shall initially be presumed when the victim is admitted to hospital, suffers a fracture to a limb, rib or vertebrae or to the skull, suffers burns to a major portion of the body or loses any portion of the body or suffers loss of vision or hearing, or alleges sexual assault. Where a prolonged delay is likely before the seriousness of the injury can be assessed, the Unit should be notified so that it can monitor the situation and decide on the extent of its involvement.
This report relates to the SIU’s investigation into the death of Mr. Leslie Hegedus, a 73-year-old man, during an interaction with the police.
The Investigation
Notification of the SIU
On July 15, 2020, at 11:00 a.m., the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) reported the following.
On July 15, 2020, Mr. Hegedus attended a grocery store where he fought and assaulted staff members over wearing a mask. When he left the store, he got into his vehicle and started driving. As he was driving, he damaged other vehicles. An OPP officer initiated a pursuit but it was called off by the communications centre.
A query was conducted on the licence plate of the vehicle that Mr. Hegedus was driving, and it linked to a residence located on Indian Point Road, Haliburton Highland.
When police officers approached the residence, two shots were fired at them (no police officers were reported being struck).
The scene was contained, and a Critical Incident Command was set up. Tactical Response Unit (TRU) police officers eventually attended. Emergency Response Team (ERT) Subject Officer (SO) #2 and SO #1 discharged their firearms, striking Mr. Hegedus in the lower right extremity.
Mr. Hegedus was taken to the Haliburton Highland Health Services (HHHS) hospital via ambulance.
At 1:09 p.m., the OPP advised the SIU that Mr. Hegedus had been pronounced dead at 11:47 a.m.
The Team
Number of SIU Investigators assigned: 4
Number of SIU Forensic Investigators assigned: 3
An SIU Forensic Investigator photographed the scene and measured it for forensic mapping purposes. The firearms and shell casings were retrieved. The trees in the search areas were examined and photographed for ballistic trajectory analysis. A metal detector was used to conduct a grid search in the area.
The area was canvassed for witnesses and closed-circuit television cameras.
The SIU Affected Persons Coordinator was engaged.
Complainant:
Leslie Hegedus 73-year-old male, deceased
[Note : A complainant is an individual who was involved in some form of interaction with police, during the course of which she or he sustained serious injury, died or is alleged to have been sexually assaulted.]
Civilian Witnesses (CW)
CW #1 Interviewed
CW #2 Interviewed
CW #3 Interviewed
CW #4 Interviewed
CW #5 Interviewed
The civilian witnesses were interviewed between July 15, 2020 and August 10, 2020.
Witness Officers (WO)
WO #1 Interviewed
WO #2 Interviewed
WO #3 Interviewed
WO #4 Interviewed
WO #5 Notes reviewed, interview deemed not necessary
WO #1, WO #2, WO #3 and WO #4 were interviewed on July 17, 2020.
[Note : A witness officer is a police officer who, in the opinion of the SIU Director, is involved in the incident under investigation but is not a subject officer.
Upon request by the SIU, witness officers have a duty under Ontario Regulation 267/10 of the Police Services Act, to submit to interviews with SIU investigators and answer all their questions. The SIU is also entitled to a copy of their notes from the police service.]
Subject Officers
SO #1 Interviewed, and notes received and reviewed
SO #2 Interviewed, and notes received and reviewed
The subject officers were interviewed on July 23, 2020.
[Note : A subject officer is a police officer whose conduct appears, in the Director’s opinion, to have caused the death or serious injury under investigation.
Subject officers are invited, but cannot be legally compelled, to present themselves for an interview with the SIU and they do not have to submit their notes to the SIU pursuant to Ontario Regulation 267/10 of the Police Services Act.]
Evidence
The Scene
The scene was located in and around Mr. Hegedus’ residence on Indian Point Road, Dysart, near Haliburton. It extended north from this address approximately 150 to 200 metres along the road to an area including part of the east side of the roadway and an area inside the bush line approximately 20 metres from the roadway edge.
Prior to formal examination and search of the scene, it was divided into four separate areas to assist in the mapping:
Area A, the most northerly location, consisted of a collection of silver rifle cartridge cases which were on the east side of the roadway and along the bank of the ditch that paralleled the road.
Area B was southeast of area A, and was within the bush line on the east side of the road. It was four metres inside the bush line and 14 metres from the road surface. Located in this area was a rifle, pistol, clothing items and medical debris.
Area C was south of area A. It consisted of a collection of silver rifle cartridges cases which were on the east side of the roadway and along the bank of the ditch that paralleled the road.
Area D was within a small clearing on the south side of the driveway and consisted of two brass-coloured rifle cartridge cases.
The driveway at the Indian Point Road property travelled from the roadway to the residence and other outbuildings on the property. There was a gate at the driveway entrance that was locked. There was a police vehicle, a Dodge Charger, parked near the entrance orientated west.
The residence was not visible from the roadway. There were other outbuildings along the driveway that were also not visible from the roadway. The front door of the residence showed no signs of being breached but the door to the garage was open and the doorway leading from the garage to the interior of the residence appeared to be breached.
The outbuildings had their entrances breached showing damage.
There was a small clearing in the bush area along the driveway approximately 20 metres from the roadway and to the south. In this clearing two cartridge cases were in the weeds.
From the driveway entrance and travelling north along Indian Point Road approximately .1 kilometres there was an area along the east roadway edge and into the ditch where there were several cartridge cases.
There was another area east off the roadway towards the bush line that was approximately 15 metres from the roadway up a sharp incline consisting of rock and soil.
Exhibit 1 – “Ruger” Mini 14 .223 caliber semi-automatic rifle was found lying with the breech closed and the magazine removed. Cartridges were noted inside the magazine. The safety was disengaged.
Exhibit 2 – “Browning” .380 auto semi-automatic pistol was found approximately three metres from the rifle with the breech closed and two magazines close by. Cartridges were noted in both magazines.
Exhibit 3 – a knapsack was found in the northeast corner of the clearing. A preliminary examination of the contents revealed several boxes of ammunition consisting of .223 caliber and .380 auto caliber.
Exhibit 4 – a camouflaged coat was lying next to the knapsack. It showed signs of the Emergency Medical Services intervention, meaning that it had been cut open. Several rounds of loose ammunition were inside various pockets. In clear view amongst the weeds a single cartridge case was also found.
Figure 1 – Ruger Mini 14 .223 caliber
Figure 2 – Browning .380 auto semi-automatic pistol
Figure 3 – SO #2’s C8 rifle
Figure 4 – SO #1’s C8 rifle
Scene Diagrams
Forensic Evidence
Centre of Forensic Sciences (CFS) Submissions and Results
The 32 spent cartridge cases recovered at the scene by the SIU, and the involved firearms, were submitted to the CFS for examination. By way of report dated December 7, 2020, the CFS concluded that:
• Six cases were fired from Mr. Hegedus’ Ruger .223 semi-automatic rifle; • Seventeen cases were fired from SO #2’s C8 rifle; and • Nine cases were fired from SO #1’s C8 rifle.
Video/Audio/Photographic Evidence
Summary of the OPP Drone Footage
The drone flew up and over the property on Indian Point Road by the driveway, from the road onto the property and out towards the road.
The drone flew down the basement steps into the basement. There were numerous boxes stacked on top of each other throughout the basement on the ground and on shelves. The drone came back to the steps and flew up to the main floor.
Police Communications Recordings
Summary of Communication Recordings
A 911 call was received from a woman reporting an incident at the Valu-mart. A man had beaten up a staff member and was driving his black car; the licence plate was provided. No ambulance was required and no weapon was used – just fists. The man’s car was smashed up from hitting the building and some grocery carts. He had hit two people in the store. The man was upset with an employee who had asked him to put on a mask.
At 8:19 a.m., a man reported a driver had tried to run down people in the parking lot driving a black European car and left going north on Highway 35. The driver looked of sound mind and was mad about a mask. The vehicle was registered to Mr. Hegedus at an address on Indian Point Road.
At 9:13 a.m., a sergeant of the OPP Communications Centre made several phone calls for people to respond to the incident. The sergeant advised there was a pursuit, which he called off. The residence was bushy, with a windy road leading to it. There was a complaint of guns in 2011.
A dispatcher advised units proceeding to that address that there were some weapons complaints from 2011 involving the registered owner of the vehicle. Neighbours had reported that he was shooting off guns all night. Officers were advised to use caution.
A unit advised he was in front of the residence on Indian Point Road; he could not see up the laneway. Officers had done a quick check of the property, and there were fresh tire marks into the garage. The officers were now performing containment.
It was reported that shots had been fired (two shots could be heard on the recording). An officer was heard yelling to stay back. An officer advised he fired in the woods, and that he did not have a visual.
Communications reported that everyone was to back up away from the property.
It was reported that ERT was there, and that there were fresh tire tracks to the garage. The male had fired two shots in the woods; no person was injured. The officers were requesting ERT and TRU, and orders to put down a spike belt in case Mr. Hegedus decided to leave. It was noted that there were grounds to arrest for assault, and that the situation involved officer safety.
The sergeant made calls and learned Mr. Hegedus’ injuries were life-threatening.
At 11:45 a.m., Mr. Hegedus was at the hospital. The sergeant spoke to someone who advised Mr. Hegedus was pronounced deceased at 11:47 a.m. at the hospital.
Materials obtained from Police Service
Upon request the SIU obtained and reviewed the following materials and documents from the OPP:
Notes-SO #2;
Notes-WO #5;
Notes-WO #4;
Notes-WO #3;
Notes-WO #1;
Notes-WO #2;
Notes-SO #1;
Communication Recordings;
OPP Scenes of Crime Officer Photos;
OPP Drone Footage;
Occurrence Details;
OPP Evidence Property Collection Report – SO #2;
OPP Evidence Property Collection Report – SO #1;
OPP Occurrences involving Mr. Hegedus;
Training Records; and
Will State-SO #2.
Materials obtained from Other Sources
The SIU obtained and reviewed the following records from non-police sources:
Incident and Ambulance Call Reports;
CFS Biology Report dated August 18, 2020;
CFS Firearms Report dated December 7, 2020;
Preliminary Autopsy Findings Report from Ontario Forensic Pathology Service dated July 17, 2020
Post-mortem Report from Coroner’s Office dated October 13, 2020;
Building Permit Application – Mr. Hegedus;
Driver’s licence photo of Mr. Hegedus; and
Photos of Mr. Hegedus from a civilian.
Incident Narrative
The material events in question are clear on the evidence collected by the SIU, which included interviews with both subject officers, several witness police officers, and a number of civilians with information about Mr. Hegedus’ conduct in the moments prior to the shootout. At about 10:50 a.m. of July 15, 2020, Mr. Hegedus, attired in camouflage and hiding in thick bush north of his residence on Indian Point Road, suffered multiple gunshot wounds. The wounds were inflicted by SO #1 and/or SO #2, each discharging his C8 rifle repeatedly at Mr. Hegedus from a distance of about 20 metres. The officers were returning fire. Just before the first of the officers’ shots, Mr. Hegedus had fired in SO #1’s direction with a .223 caliber rifle.
The shooting was the culmination of a train of events that began shortly after 8:00 a.m. at the Valu-mart in Minden. Mr. Hegedus had entered the store without wearing a face covering. Upon being reminded by a store associate of the need to do so, an angry Mr. Hegedus indicated he would not do so and started pummeling the employee. A fellow associate came to assist her colleague and was, in turn, assaulted by Mr. Hegedus. She was ultimately able to force Mr. Hegedus out of the store. However, Mr. Hegedus’ rampage was not over. He entered his vehicle – a black Alfa Romeo – and drove at store employees gathered outside. Mr. Hegedus’ vehicle also struck the exterior of the store and several shopping carts before it travelled onto Highway 35 and proceeded northward. The police were called and advised of what had just transpired.
WO #4 was dispatched to the scene and observed Mr. Hegedus in his vehicle heading east on County Road 21. The officer pulled in behind the Alfa Romeo and activated his emergency lights, but Mr. Hegedus kept driving. At one point, with WO #4 having maneuvered his cruiser alongside the driver’s side of the Alfa Romeo, Mr. Hegedus veered sharply to his left, prompting the officer to brake hard to avoid a collision. The vehicles turned left onto York Street, and then left again to travel north on Maple Avenue, after which WO #4 was directed by a superior officer to terminate the pursuit. He did so, stopping by the side of the road until he was allowed to proceed again in the direction of Mr. Hegedus’ home address.
At about 9:00 a.m., followed closely by WO #3 and then WO #1, WO #4 arrived at the property on Indian Point Road – the address associated with the licence plate marker of Mr. Hegedus’ vehicle. The property consisted of a home and several outbuildings east of the roadway. The area around it was densely populated with trees and brush. Aware that Mr. Hegedus was a registered gun owner, and that there had been past noise complaints related to firearm discharges from the property, WO #3 and WO #4 put on their body-armour and equipped themselves with C8 rifles before venturing onto the address through a closed gate at the start of the lane leading to the house. The officers detected what appeared to be freshly-made tire tracks leading into a garage, but there was no sight of Mr. Hegedus. Returning back to Indian Point Road, WO #3 and WO #4 reported their findings to WO #1.
WO #1 had just decided to position WO #3 and WO #4 with their vehicles north and south of the property, respectively, to contain the area when Mr. Hegedus, from a position of concealment in the bush south of his driveway, fired his rifle twice at WO #1. The time was about 9:30 a.m. Neither round struck WO #1, who hurried for cover behind his cruiser. WO #1 broadcast that shots had been fired. After a period behind his cruiser, and with WO #4 returning to the area to provide cover, WO #1 ran north and made it to WO #3’s cruiser. From that position, the officer radioed for the deployment of tactical officers.
OPP ERT officers, SO #2 and SO #1, arrived at the OPP command centre in the area of Harburn and Indian Point Roads. Armed with C8 rifles, the officers made their way south on Indian Point Road and eventually came across WO #1 and WO #3. WO #1 briefed them on the gunfire they had received, noting that it seemed to come from Mr. Hegedus’ residence. SO #2 and SO #1 continued south.
Approximately 15 to 20 metres north of the address on Indian Point Road, SO #1 observed a silhouette in the bush east of the road on elevated ground. He trained his rifle in that direction and watched as the silhouette moved, convincing him that it was a person. SO #1 repeatedly yelled out at the person to show his hands and SO #2, running to a position south of the person, did the same. The person was Mr. Hegedus.
Mr. Hegedus fired his rifle in SO #1’s direction, prompting SO #1 and SO #2 to discharge their weapons at him multiple times. In the course of this exchange, it appears Mr. Hegedus fired further rounds from his rifle before he was incapacitated. In total, SO #1 and SO #2 fired nine and 19 rounds, respectively.
Following the gunfire, SO #1 made his way south to SO #2’s position, from which vantage point the officers could see and hear Mr. Hegedus lying behind a tree stump and groaning. The rifle lay partially across his lap. The officers yelled out to Mr. Hegedus to show his hands and radioed for an ambulance, which had staged north of the scene. After a period of non-response, SO #2, now joined by WO #5, a TRU member arriving at the scene, approached Mr. Hegedus and began to administer first aid to his gunshot wounds.
Paramedics arrived at the scene and took over Mr. Hegedus’ care. He was taken to hospital and pronounced deceased at about 11:47 a.m.
Mr. Hegedus’ rifle – a Ruger .223 semi-automatic rifle – was recovered at the scene, together with a magazine loaded with five rounds. The magazine was capable of holding ten rounds. Also recovered at the scene was a Browning .380 semi-automatic pistol with two associated magazines, and a knapsack that contained numerous rounds of .223 and .380 calibre ammunition.
Cause of Death
At autopsy, Mr. Hegedus was found to have sustained three gunshot wounds: a perforating gunshot wound of the right back that exited the right abdomen; a penetrating gunshot wound of the anterior right forearm, which may have been a re-entry wound from the projectile that exited the perforating gunshot wound of the right back; and, a penetrating gunshot wound of the left back. The pathologist attributed Mr. Hegedus’ death to “[g]unshot wound of right back”.
Relevant Legislation
Section 34, Criminal Code — Defence of person – Use of threat of force
34 (1) A person is not guilty of an offence if(a) They believe on reasonable grounds that force is being used against them or another person or that a threat of force is being made against them or another person; (b) The act that constitutes the offence is committed for the purpose of defending or protecting themselves or the other person from that use or threat of force; and(c) The act committed is reasonable in the circumstances. (2) In determining whether the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances, the court shall consider the relevant circumstances of the person, the other parties and the act, including, but not limited to, the following factors:(a) the nature of the force or threat;(b) the extent to which the use of force was imminent and whether there were other means available to respond to the potential use of force;(c) the person’s role in the incident;(d) whether any party to the incident used or threatened to use a weapon; (e) the size, age, gender and physical capabilities of the parties to the incident;(f) the nature, duration and history of any relationship between the parties to the incident, including any prior use or threat of force and the nature of that force or threat;(f.1) any history of interaction or communication between the parties to the incident;(g) the nature and proportionality of the person’s response to the use or threat of force; and (h) whether the act committed was in response to a use or threat of force that the person knew was lawful. (3) Subsection (1) does not apply if the force is used or threatened by another person for the purpose of doing something that they are required or authorized by law to do in the administration or enforcement of the law, unless the person who commits the act that constitutes the offence believes on reasonable grounds that the other person is acting unlawfully.
Analysis and Director’s Decision
On July 15, 2020, Leslie Hegedus passed away following an exchange of gunfire with two OPP officers in Dysart, Ontario. The two officers – SO #1 and SO #2 – were identified as subject officers for purposes of the SIU investigation. On my assessment of the evidence, there are no reasonable grounds to believe that either officer committed a criminal offence in connection with Mr. Hegedus’ death.
Pursuant to section 34 of the Criminal Code, the use of force that would otherwise constitute an offence is legally justified provided it was intended in the defence of oneself or another from a reasonably apprehended attacked, actual or threatened, and was itself reasonable. With respect to the reasonableness of the force, it is to be assessed against all the relevant circumstances, including with respect to such considerations as: the nature of the force or threat; the extent to which the use of force was imminent and whether there were other means available to respond to the potential use of force; the person’s role in the incident; whether any party to the incident used or threatened to use a weapon; and, the nature and proportionality of the person’s response to the use or threat of force. In my view, the force used by SO #1 and SO #2 fell within the four corners of the justification set out in section 34.
At the outset, it is important to note that SO #1 and SO #2 were engaged in the lawful execution of their duties as they approached Mr. Hegedus’ property and then engaged him in gunfire. By that time, Mr. Hegedus had assaulted two employees of a Valu-mart, driven dangerously, including in the direction of persons, and fired twice at WO #1. He was clearly subject to arrest, and to arrest as quickly as possible given his acts of violence.
In their interviews with the SIU, SO #1 and SO #2 indicated that they fired their weapons in fear of their, and each other’s, lives. There is nothing in the record to cast doubt on those assertions. On the contrary, the circumstances were such as to lend credence to their evidence in this regard. SO #1 had just been fired upon by Mr. Hegedus at a range of about 20 metres or so. On this record, I am confident that the officers returned fire believing it to be necessary to protect themselves from death or grievous bodily harm.
I am further satisfied that the multiple rounds discharged by each officer at Mr. Hegedus – nine and 19 rounds by SO #1 and SO #2, respectively – amounted to reasonable force. There can be little doubt that Mr. Hegedus was intent on killing police officers, whose arrival at his address he would have known was imminent following his antics at the Valu-mart. Returning from the store, Mr. Hegedus had changed into a camouflaged jacket, armed himself with a rifle and handgun with an abundance of ammunition for both weapons, taken a position of concealment in and around his home, and fired twice already at WO #1, who was fortunate not to have been struck. Coming upon Mr. Hegedus in a wooded area north of his property and east of Indian Point Road, SO #1 and SO #2 ordered him repeatedly to show his hands. Mr. Hegedus chose not to do so, instead rising from a crouched position behind a tree stump and firing at SO #1. In that instant, the officers’ lives were in grave danger and they acted reasonably and proportionately, in my view, in resorting to lethal force of their own. Retreat or withdrawal were not realistic options in the moment. SO #1 was in a vulnerable position out in the roadway when Mr. Hegedus first fired his weapon; any delay incurred in seeking cover would potentially have placed his life at further risk. The same can be said with respect to SO #2, who had every reason to believe that defending his life and, more emphatically, SO #1’s life, was dependent on immediately neutralizing Mr. Hegedus. Finally, in the context of an individual who had intentionally made himself difficult to see, and evidence suggesting Mr. Hegedus fired up to three additional shots after the officers had returned fire following his first discharge, I am unable to reasonably conclude that the number of shots fired by the officers was excessive. In arriving at this conclusion, I am mindful of the fact that Mr. Hegedus was only struck by three (and possibly just two) rounds, and that the gunfire occurred with rapidity and ceased when it was clear that Mr. Hegedus was down and no longer a threat.
In the final analysis, while it remains unclear which of Mr. Hegedus’ gunshot wounds were caused by which officer, there are no reasonable grounds to believe that either SO #1 or SO #2 acted other than lawfully throughout this incident. Accordingly, there is no basis for proceeding with criminal charges in this case, and the file is closed.
Date: June 14, 2021
Electronically approved by
Joseph Martino Director Special Investigations Unit
In politics, they call summer the silly season. Hardly anything of substance seems to happen, and the politicians are typically in their ridings having BBQs and whatnot.
Such was the case on Sunday in Thornhill, Ontario, just north of Toronto. The outgoing MP, Peter Kent, was having a summer shindig in the parking lot of the Promenade Mall. I dropped by not so much for Mr. Kent, but to interview the replacement candidate for the federal riding of Thornhill, Melissa Lantsman.
I assume most people don’t know who Melissa Lantsman is, but they should. She was Ontario Premier Doug Ford’s war room director in 2018 and helped create slogans like “For the People” and “Ontario: Open for Business.”
Alas, we all discovered that when the COVID pandemic hit last year, the Doug Ford PCs were not “for the people,” and Ontario was very much closed for business. Oh, not all businesses, mind you. If you were a U.S.-based multi-billion dollar conglomerate such as Costco or Walmart, it was business as usual.
And speaking of Walmart, by 2020, Lantsman had resumed duties as a lobbyist. And she lobbied mightily for the Arkansas-based superstore chain. Lantsman went to Premier Ford and successfully ensured Walmart would be exempt from any lockdown rules.
So now that Lantsman is the Conservative Party candidate for Thornhill in 2021, I wanted to ask her a simple question: how can she possibly run to be the MP to represent the people of Thornhill when she was personally responsible for engineering a lockdown policy that caused so many businesses to fold and so many people to be thrown out of work? I mean, her nickname is actually “Lockdown Lantsman.” How do you recover from that? And it was hard to believe this woman is a professional communicator, given how tongue-tied she got when it came to answering hard questions.
And then I wanted to know how she became the representative for the Thornhill riding in the first place. You see, a few months ago, Ontario PC MPP Gila Martow was vying for this position. Martow is a veteran politician who is well-liked and well-respected. I think she would’ve been a slam dunk to win the riding in the next federal election. When Lantsman was declared the winner, it was a shock to everyone — including Lantsman herself, who did not have a victory speech prepared! So, either those exit polls were mightily flawed or this was a screw job of Herculean proportions.
So, I reached out to members of the Martow camp, none of whom want to be named. Why would the Conservative party go with a candidate who has more baggage than the Arrivals terminal at Pearson International Airport?
And the answer was this: it had everything to do with Melissa Lantsman’s sexual orientation.
You see, the Erin O’Toole Conservatives are obsessed with the party being a so-called “Big Tent” operation – it’s not just a bunch of old white guys anymore, you see. They’re sick of the CBC calling them names.
And what better way to prove that point than to promote a LGBTQ candidate representing the Conservatives in the suburbs? Wow, look at that diversity!
Now, folks, I personally do not give a rodent’s rectum if a candidate is a lesbian or a Martian. I think it’s irrelevant. But Lantsman and the Conservatives can’t stop talking about her gayness — it was their main selling point. Is the Conservative Party now fully invested in identity politics and playing the race card and gender card and sexual orientation card? What about who is the best person for the job — no matter what
So, I asked Melissa: is she the candidate for Thornhill based on merit, or her sexual orientation? She sort of answered the question and didn’t object to it. I asked it again, and she ignored me. And that was that.
I had more questions about Walmart, but then I was interrupted — by police! The Lantsman campaign called the cops on me. But there is no crime of asking prickly questions, so they lied to the police, making accusations that I assaulted people. It was the other way around. They were purposely bumping into me and trying to block me. They knocked my hat off. They threw water on me. And for what? Asking questions
And how about this slice of unethical behaviour: while I was being arrested and handcuffed by police, one of them stole my clipboard notebook and took photos of my notes. What’s the deal with that? What kind of political party has a reporter arrested, and then steals their notebook and takes pictures of it?
It looked awful on the Conservatives — especially having me arrested. So after ten hours, they decided to revise history. They say I engaged in homophobic slurs against Lantsman? What? I did not — you can see my question and her answer to it. It wasn’t homophobic, and she obviously didn’t think it was at the time — until later, when her spin doctors needed a way to change the subject from having me arrested, throwing things at me and stealing my notebook.
My final question to Lantsman was this: when Erin O’Toole was running to be the Conservative leader, he was the pro-free speech/anti-cancel culture candidate. And then he becomes leader, and it turns out he is pro-cancel culture/anti-free speech. So I asked Melissa what’s the deal with that?
Could you imagine a real leader such as Donald Trump saying “no comment,” and even running away? Can you imagine a politician of substance calling the cops to have a reporter criminally charged? And that’s what Lockdown Lantsman did on Sunday — she or her minions called the cops. She later issued a press release saying it was a safety issue. A “safety issue” — yeah, my safety! I was pushed, shoved, splashed with a liquid and arrested.
And in the department of perverse irony, check out the tweet Mr. O’Toole issued around the same time I was being stuffed into a police cruiser based on lies from the Lantsman camp: “If you don’t support free speech, you have four parties to choose from. If you do, you only have one: Canada’s Conservatives.” Sorry, Mr. O’Toole. Sorry, Lockdown Lantsman. Actions speak louder than words. And just like Andrew Scheer, you are already blowing this election. Big time.
