CAFE & JCCF Granted Intervenor Status for Bill Whatcott’s Motion to Have Oger’s Transgendered Discrimination Complaint Dismissed as Meritless

On December 1, the Canadian Association for Free Expression and the Justice Cenre for Constitutional Freedoms , both pro-free speech intervenors in a complaint before the British Columbia Human Rights Commission were granted intervenor status in a special application filed by Mr. Whatcott seeking summary dismissal of the complaint by flamboyant transgendered activist and failed NDP candidate Rona Oger, formerly married and who has fathered two children, but now styles himself a woman and uses the name “Morgane”. Oger filed the complaint in retaliation for Mr. Whatcott’s distributing 1,500 leaflets during last May’s provincial election arguing that, if Oger cannot even get his gender right, he dopes not have the judgement to be a good MLA (Member of the Legislative Assembly.

Ronan Oger Now “Morgane” Oger

CAFE and JCCF were both accepted as intervenors in this motion and have until December 22 to file their submissions, CAFE’s Director Paul Fromm and JCCF attorney Jay Cameron were told today.

The following is evangelist and victim Bill Whatcott’s motion, filed December 8.

Dear Mr. Rilkoff, Ms Quail and others,

I am filing my application to dismiss on the following grounds,

BC Human Rights Code:

27 (1) A member or panel may, at any time after a complaint is filed and with or without a

hearing, dismiss all or part of the complaint if that member or panel determines that any of the

following apply:

(b) the acts or omissions alleged in the complaint or that part of the complaint do not

contravene this Code;

And the Word of God:

“He who created them from the beginning made them male and female.”

Matthew 19:5

There is a very high threshold which must be established for a finding of ‘hate speech’ under

provincial human rights codes further to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision

in Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, [2013] 1 SCR 467, 2013 SCC 11

(CanLII). The flyers are not even remotely close to meeting that threshold.

According to the Supreme Court in that case:

The definition of “hatred” set out in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, 1990 CanLII

26 (SCC), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892, with some modifications, provides a workable approach to

interpreting the word “hatred” as it is used in legislative provisions prohibiting hate speech.

Three main prescriptions must be followed. First, courts must apply the hate speech prohibitions

objectively. The question courts must ask is whether a reasonable person, aware of the context

and circumstances, would view the expression as exposing the protected group to

hatred. Second, the legislative term “hatred” or “hatred or contempt” must be interpreted as

being restricted to those extreme manifestations of the emotion described by the words

“detestation” and “vilification”. This filters out expression which, while repugnant and

offensive, does not incite the level of abhorrence, delegitimization and rejection that risks

causing discrimination or other harmful effects. Third, tribunals must focus their analysis on the

effect of the expression at issue, namely whether it is likely to expose the targeted person or

group to hatred by others. The repugnancy of the ideas being expressed is not sufficient to

justify restricting the expression, and whether or not the author of the expression intended to

incite hatred or discriminatory treatment is irrelevant. The key is to determine the likely effect of

the expression on its audience, keeping in mind the legislative objectives to reduce or eliminate

discrimination. In light of these three directives, the term “hatred” contained in a legislative hate

speech prohibition should be applied objectively to determine whether a reasonable person,

aware of the context and circumstances, would view the expression as likely to expose a person

or persons to detestation and vilification on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination.

In my submission, simply expressing the opinion that the Complainant is a man does not

possibly rise to the level of hate speech. The fact that the Complainant was a political candidate

and narrowly lost is irrelevant to whether the speech is hate speech under Whatcott SCC 2013.

The Tribunal must first ask, “whether a reasonable person, aware of the context and

circumstances, would view the expression as exposing the protected group to hatred.” The flyers

do not expose the Complainant to hatred. The flyers express the opinion that the Complainant is

a man, and that people should not vote for someone who pretends to be a woman for the

purposes of an election. The purpose of the flyers is to bring transparency to the democratic

process – voters deserve transparency. Saying that someone should not vote for a candidate is not

exposing them to “hatred”. The flyers express a protected religious belief that gender is male and

female, and not subject to change. That is not hate speech. That is an opinion, and we have

freedom to have those under section 2(b) of the Charter in this country.

Second, the Tribunal must restrict its consideration of the whether the flyers were “hateful” to a

definition of hatred that restricts itself to the one the Supreme Court of Canada outlined

in Whatcott: “extreme manifestations of the emotion described by the words “detestation” and

“vilification””. The flyers do not even begin to approach extreme manifestations described by

“detestation” and “vilification”. The flyers don’t advocate violence or persecution – they advocate

not voting for the Complainant. That does not even remotely qualify as “hate”.

Third, the Tribunal must focus on the expression and consider whether it was “likely to

expose the targeted person or group to hatred by others. The repugnancy of the ideas being

expressed is not sufficient to justify restricting the expression, and whether or not the

author of the expression intended to incite hatred or discriminatory treatment is

irrelevant.” The result of the community was predictable: they either told me I was an

idiot, or they ignored me. No one read the flyer and “vilified” the Complainant. No one

acted out against the Complainant. The Complainant has pointed to no harm at all from the

flyers, except to claim that the Complainant lost the election because of them, which is

irrelevant to a consideration of this matter, and no link has been established between the

election result and the flyers, in any event.

I could not be successfully sued for defamation for the content of the flyers: the

Complainant fathered two children with a biological woman that the Complainant was

once married or in a common law relationship with. It is not hateful to highlight biological

reality. The Complainant identifies as a woman, but the Complainant differs

physiologically from a biological woman. It is not hate speech to point this out.

Lastly, many millions of people in Canada believe and express the biological reality of sex

as being male or female. The statements in the flyers are not unusual. They represent a

common understanding of biology that is both accepted in science and taught in religion.

In Whatcott, the Court delineated the line between protected expression under the Charter

and hate speech:

“In my view, expression that “ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of” does

not rise to the level of ardent and extreme feelings that were found essential to the

constitutionality of s. 13(1) of the CHRA in Taylor. Those words are not synonymous with

“hatred” or “contempt”. Rather, they refer to expression which is derogatory and

insensitive, such as representations criticizing or making fun of protected groups on the

basis of their commonly shared characteristics and practices, or on stereotypes. As

Richards J.A. observed in Owens, at para. 53:

Much speech which is self-evidently constitutionally protected involves some measure of

ridicule, belittlement or an affront to dignity grounded in characteristics like race, religion

and so forth. I have in mind, by way of general illustration, the editorial cartoon which

satirizes people from a particular country, the magazine piece which criticizes the social

policy agenda of a religious group and so forth. Freedom of speech in a healthy and robust

democracy must make space for that kind of discourse . . . .

I agree. Expression criticizing or creating humour at the expense of others can be

derogatory to the extent of being repugnant. Representations belittling a minority group or

attacking its dignity through jokes, ridicule or insults may be hurtful and offensive.

However, for the reasons discussed above, offensive ideas are not sufficient to ground a

justification for infringing on freedom of expression. While such expression may inspire

feelings of disdain or superiority, it does not expose the targeted group to hatred.”

The complaint should be dismissed because there is no reasonable chance it will succeed in

light of the law in regard to hate speech from the Supreme Court of Canada.

Under section 27(1)(b), the Complaint should be dismissed because the flyers are not a

contravention of the Human Rights Code.

Finally, the flyers are clearly in harmony with Matthew 19 in the Holy Bible, and I would

like to remind the Chairperson and everyone else reading this; God is the highest arbiter of

right and wrong and one day we will all stand before Him.

In Christ’s Service,

Bill Whatcott